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No. 8, August 1981

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POLITICAL INSTRUCTION BASED ON 26TH PARTY CONGRESS MATERIALS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 3-10

[Article by Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences Maj Gen A. Shurygin: "Further Development of Teaching on the Party in the Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress"]

[Text] The 26th CPSU Congress is a most important landmark in the life of our party and nation. It constituted an event of world-historic significance. The congress resolutions are an inspiring program of further advance by our homeland along the road to communism. All successes in building communism, in strengthening the nation's defense capability and in increasing the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces are inseparably linked with the guiding and directing activities of the Communist Party.

I

Teaching on the Communist Party, its place and role in the affairs of society is an integral component part of Marxist-Leninist theory of the liberation struggle of the worker class. K. Marx and F. Engels proved and the practical experience of societal development has confirmed that without its own independent political party, the proletariat cannot accomplish its designated mission -- to overthrow capitalism and to build a classless society.

Guided by the theoretical legacy of K. Marx and F. Engels, V. I. Lenin created in a new era a balanced and integral teaching on the Communist party, substantiated its leadership role and formulated the ideological and organizational principles as well as the standards of internal affairs and the principles of party leadership. The party, V. I. Lenin stressed, is called upon "to lead the entire people toward socialism, to guide and organize the new system, to be teacher, guide and leader for all the workers...."[1]

The validity of this teaching was confirmed by the heroic history of the Soviet people. The Communist Party and its Central Committee constantly guided the activities of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council, the Ministry of War, and the revolutionary military councils of the fronts and armies. Root questions of military policy and military strategy, national defense, army and navy organizational development were decided at Central Committee plenums, at meetings of the Politburo and Orgburo of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)].

Subsequently the leadership role of the CPSU in building socialism grew steadily. Objectively this is due to the fact that, in the first place, the party is the forward detachment of the worker class and of all working people and unites in its ranks the most conscious segment of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. It is armed with the laws of societal development, scientific theory of building socialism and communism, and a wealth of practical experience. Second, the CPSU comprises the highest, most developed form of class organization, unifies and coordinates the activities of numerous worker organizations, cements and consolidates their will and actions into a single, unified whole. V. I. Lenin stated: "...Only the political party of the worker class, that is, the Communist Party, is capable... of directing all the unified activities of the entire proletariat, that is, of guiding it politically and, through the proletariat, of guiding all the worker masses."[3] Thirdly, the leading role of the CPSU in the political system of the Soviet society is also dictated by its profound, inseparable bond with the people. The CPSU exists for the people and serves the people. It enjoys the profound trust and support of the people, which have been earned by its selfless, heroic struggle for the interests of Soviet citizens and by the correctness of its political line. Fourthly, the leadership role of the CPSU in our society is also due to its democratic character of organization and activity.

The directing and guiding role of the Communist Party finds expression in the fact that the CPSU, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory and proceeding from urgent needs, elaborates a scientifically substantiated policy of the Soviet state in the areas of economic, social, military and international relations. Today the leadership role of the CPSU in our nation is formally stated in the USSR Constitution, which reads as follows: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union constitutes the guiding and directing force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, governmental and public organizations."[4]

The party determines not only the policies of the socialist state but also the content and direction of activities of agencies of governmental authority and all public organizations. It coordinates the actions of all mass organizations of working people, directs Communist indoctrination of the masses, and organizes it in a practical manner.

The CPSU embodies in its activities the Leninist principle of unity of theory and practice, science and politics, word and deed. Developing the theory of scientific communism, the party works persistently to perfect the art of political leadership and management in conformity with concrete-historical conditions.

The question of the leadership role of the Communist Party is one of the root questions of the revolutionary movement and the building of a new society. It has today become a key point in the struggle between Marxist-Leninists and the representatives of various forms of revisionism.

The CPSU proceeds from the position that its leadership and direction should encompass and does encompass all areas and spheres of the political and socioeconomic affairs of society without exception. But the party exercises political direction of society, not administrative. It does not supplant soviet and economic agencies, trade union and public organizations, but coordinates and guides their activities. The Communist Party bears particular responsibility as the sole force capable

of uniting the efforts of the worker masses in the struggle to build a Communist society.

The CPSU, as a living political organism, is continuously growing and developing, together with the development of society, change and increasing complexity of the tasks advanced by the historical process. The party's leading role is also growing and improving, deepening and becoming content-enriched.

Steady growth in the party's leadership role is an objective pattern of development of our society. The causes and factors which predetermine enhancement of the role of the CPSU in the period of building communism are concretely and objectively reflected in our party's Program.

The basic factors which determine enhancement of the leadership role of the CPSU in present-day conditions include the following: growth in the scale and complexity of the tasks of building communism, which demand a higher level of political and organizational leadership; an upsurge in the productive activity of the masses, involvement of additional millions of working people in management of the affairs of state and production; further development of socialist democracy and enhancement of the role of public organizations; the increasing significance of theory of scientific communism and the necessity of intensification of Communist indoctrination of working people.[6]

The proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, the documents of which fill program points with new content, have provided a wealth of material, which helps penetrate more deeply into circumstances which cause an increase in the leadership role of the CPSU in conditions of mature socialism.

Today life is advancing problems which are unequalled in history in scale and significance. The gigantic growth of socialist production and enormous qualitative changes in our economy and the sociopolitical development of society demand of the party further enhancement of the level of political and organizational leadership, as well as comprehensive improvement in its forms and methods. On the other hand, substantial changes in external conditions and the complexity of the international situation evoke the necessity of enhancing the leadership role of the CPSU at the contemporary stage.

Taking all this into consideration, the 26th CPSU Congress stressed the correctness of the conclusion reached by the 25th CPSU Congress that the role of the party in the affairs of society becomes greater in the period of developed socialism. "The last five years," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report, "have shown that this conclusion is unquestionably valid. The well-known Leninist formula that the party is the intellect, honor and conscience of our era is being perceived even more profoundly today, in light of the impressive achievements of the Soviet people."[7] Thus the congress has confirmed that the fundamental thesis on continuous growth in the leadership role of our party has been and remains a fundamental law and pattern of the building of communism.

II

Leninist teaching on the party experienced further development in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress. They contain fundamental points on such vital problems of theory and practice of party organizational development as growth and strengthening of party ranks, increased demandingness on Communists, on their vanguard role, and on observance of standards of party ethics and morality; improvement of intraparty affairs and methods of party leadership; improvement in ideological and political indoctrination work, party education, etc.

Congress conclusions and instructions pertaining to party growth and composition are of fundamental significance. The question of membership in the CPSU always has been and remains a root question of intraparty affairs. The objective trend toward enhancement of the leadership role of the CPSU, its prestige and authority is leading to a situation where more and more Soviet citizens are seeking to link their destiny with the party, not only ideologically but organizationally as well. CPSU membership increased by 1.8 million persons in the period between the 25th and 26th congresses. The party presently contains 17.5 million members. This is an important indicator of the prestige and authority of the CPSU and its ties with the worker masses.

The party, however, does not force membership growth. It accepts into its ranks those persons who are the most worthy, guided by the Leninist thesis that "we absolutely do not want party members for purposes of ostentation."[8] The CPSU resolutely eliminates those who fail to justify the party's high trust. The 26th CPSU Congress emphatically stressed: "Nobody gets a free ride when it is a question of the honor and prestige of our party and the purity of its ranks!"[10]

The CPSU Central Committee displays great concern to ensure that the membership of the party optimally reflects the social structure of our society, that workers occupy a leading position in party ranks. Thanks to consistent implementation of this course of policy, as of the convening of the 26th CPSU Congress, party membership broke down as follows: 43.4 percent workers, 12.8 percent kolkhoz farmers, and 43.8 percent representatives of the technical, scientific, artistic and other intelligentsia, as well as military personnel. During the period between the 25th and 26th congresses workers comprised 59 percent of new members joining the party.[11]

The social composition of the party irrefutably confirms the conclusion that the CPSU, which became a party of the entire people at the stage of mature socialism, remains today a party of the worker class in its class essence.

The conclusions and instructions of the 26th CPSU Congress directed toward improving methods of party leadership make a major contribution toward further innovative development of Leninist teaching on the party.

It was noted in the CPSU Central Committee Report that party congresses constitute the highest expression of the leadership role of the CPSU, laying out the general route, as it were, of the forward movement by the Soviet society. An enormous role in improving methods of party leadership is played by the CPSU Central Committee -- our party's fighting headquarters. The CPSU Central Committee resolves in a scientific manner, profoundly and efficiently, the most important problems pertaining to

the affairs of party and nation, domestic and foreign policy, and strengthening of national defense. A total of 11 Central Committee plenums, 236 Politburo meetings, and 250 meetings of the Central Committee Secretariat were held in the period between the 25th and 26th congresses.[12]

The party is concerned with enhancing the role and responsibility of republic, kray, oblast, city and rayon party organizations. The congress also pointed out that "primary party organizations play a paramount role in accomplishing the large and diversified tasks of building communism."[13] The party Central Committee endeavors maximally to activate these components and demands of local party agencies constant attention toward them.

Raising the level of direction of all aspects of societal affairs, organizational and political work with the masses is inseparably linked with improving selection, placement and indoctrination of cadres. Establishment of a reliable cadre reserve also has been and remains an important task.

The congress devoted considerable attention to improvement of monitoring and verification of execution as one of the important principles of party leadership.

Development of the CPSU in conditions of mature socialism is also manifested in further broadening of intraparty democracy as one of the most important conditions of the strength and solidity of our party. Development of intraparty democracy and increased activity by Communists proceeds organically from the firm principle of democratic centralism.

The historical experience of the CPSU and the other brother parties convincingly attests to the fact that democratic centralism at all stages is the foundation of the unity, solidarity, and healthy development of Marxist-Leninist parties. Precisely for this reason the 26th CPSU Congress once against emphasized that "democratic centralism is an absolute standard of Communist Party affairs."[15]

The congress documents contain important conclusions and assessments on questions pertaining to improving ideological indoctrination work. The 26th CPSU Congress stressed the fundamental importance of the 26 April 1979 CPSU Central Committee decree for improving ideological and political indoctrination work. This document, intended for long-term effect, formulates vital tasks in this area at the present stage: securement of a high scientific level of propaganda and agitation; strengthening of its efficiency and concreteness, link with practical realities and with accomplishment of economic and political tasks; development of an aggressive character.

The 26th CPSU Congress presented concrete guidelines on such basic matters of party ideological indoctrination work as further innovative elaboration of Marxist-Leninist theory, development of the social sciences, organization of propaganda, and handling of party instruction.

Essentially reorganization of many areas of ideological work was discussed at the congress.

The CPSU constructs Communist indoctrination, just as all its revolutionary-transforming activity, on the solid foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory. The Central Committee Report to the CPSU Congress is a document of great theoretical and practical significance. It profoundly analyzes the results of development of our country in all areas of societal affairs, defines the main directions of CPSU internal and external policy, reveals the principal problems which must be resolved, and points out the ways to resolve them.

The 26th CPSU Congress decree on drafting a new revision of the CPSU Program is an example of a genuinely innovative approach to development of Marxist-Leninist theory.

Thus the 26th CPSU Congress comprehensively examined root problems of theory and practice of party organizational development. The points and conclusions of the CPSU Central Committee Report on these questions make a new contribution toward innovative development of Leninist teaching on the party.

III

The leadership role of the Communist Party is also manifested in military organizational development, in direction and leadership of the Armed Forces. Herein lies the main source of their strength and might. As early as December 1918 the Central Committee of the RCP(b) issued a decree entitled "On Ministry of War Policy." It stated that "the policy of the Ministry of War, just as that of all other ministries and establishments, shall be conducted on a precise foundation of general directives issued by the party in the person of its Central Committee and under its direct supervision."[17]

The diversified Communist Party activities pertaining to leadership and guidance of the USSR Armed Forces are carried out in many areas.

The principal areas are as follows: elaboration and implementation of the military policy of the Soviet state; constant concern for development of the material-technological and scientific foundation of the nation's military might, provision of the army and navy with the most modern weapons and combat equipment; elaboration and implementation of the principles of Soviet military organizational development; concern for training military cadres; improvement of party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces, etc.

The guiding and directing role of the Communist Party was manifested particularly forcefully during the years of the Great Patriotic War -- the most difficult and savage of all the wars ever experienced by our homeland. During the years of difficult trial the CPSU, assuming responsibility for the nation's fate, became a genuinely fighting party, and its Central Committee became a genuine headquarters, exercising both supreme political and strategic direction of military operations and management of the USSR national economy. The party concentrated more than 80 percent of all Communists in the army in the field and in those branches and sectors of the economy directly supplying the needs of the battle front.

Bonds between the party and the masses grew stronger during the war years. The finest people joined the party ranks. During the war more than 5 million persons were accepted as probationary members of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), and approximately 3.5 million persons were accepted to full membership.[18]

Determining the military policy of the state in present-day conditions, the party proceeds from the position that as long as imperialism continues to exist, there will remain a danger of aggressive wars. Bearing this fact in mind, the CPSU views strengthening of the nation's defense capability and the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces as one of its main tasks, a duty and obligation of the entire Soviet people, and one of the most important functions of the socialist state.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated in an address delivered at the official dedication ceremony for a memorial complex in the hero-city of Kiev: "We are not advocates of an arms race; we oppose an arms race.... But if we are compelled, we shall find a swift and effective response to any challenge by militant imperialism, for our first and most sacred duty is to ensure the security of our country and its allies, to guarantee a reliable peace for the Soviet people."[19]

The party policy line calling for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR was reflected in the proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress. "In the period under review," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the party and government did not lose sight for a single day of matters pertaining to strengthening the defensive might of this country and its Armed Forces. The international situation obliges us to do this."[20]

As is emphasized by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "today there is not a single area of military affairs in which are not manifested the guiding and directing activities of the CPSU, its Central Committee, the Central Committee Politburo, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally. The points and conclusions contained in the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress and in the speeches and articles of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev are of most important, fundamental significance for correct theoretical and practical resolution of the problems of Army and Navy organizational development."[21]

The combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is a strong alloy of excellent technical equipment, military expertise, and indomitable morale. Therefore the party always has devoted and continues to devote unabating attention to party-political work in the Armed Forces.

An orderly system of political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations has been established and is operating in the Army and Navy, on which one-man commanders rely in their practical activities. The tasks of political agencies and party organizations are spelled out in the CPSU Program, in resolutions of congresses and CPSU Central Committee decrees.

The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress have become a fighting program for commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations. Congress demands pertaining to boosting the level of party direction of building communism, improving the organizational and ideological-political work of party organizations in the masses, and improving the work style of party, soviet and economic cadres also apply in full measure to the area of party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy.

The necessity of boosting the level of party direction of military organizational development in present-day conditions is dictated by a number of factors. First of

all, it is the complexity and conflictive nature of the international situation and the increased responsibility of the Soviet Armed Forces for preserving world peace.

Analyzing the party's international activities, the 26th CPSU Congress concluded that the aggressiveness of imperialism, and particularly U.S. imperialism, has sharply increased in present-day conditions. Storm clouds have gathered on the international horizon through the fault of imperialism. The enemies of détente have appreciably stepped up their activity. Imperialism is increasing military expenditures. In the United States, for example, they totaled 157 billion dollars in the 1980 fiscal year, will reach 178 billion in 1981, and 226 billion dollars in 1982.[22]

The foreign policy of the Chinese hegemonists is also aimed at aggravating the international situation. This policy is closely aligned with that of imperialism. A clever calculation lies behind the willingness of the United States, Japan, and a number of NATO member countries to expand military-political ties with China -- to exploit in their own interests China's hostility toward the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Continuation of a reactionary course of policy by Beijing constitutes a genuine threat to the cause of peace not only in Asia but throughout the world.

The complexity of the international situation and the danger of another world war imposed on the party, as our country's leading political force, the greatest responsibility for correctly assessing the military-political and strategic situation and for taking prompt and timely measures to hold the aggressors in check.

The Appeal to the World's Parliaments and Peoples, adopted by the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, constitutes vivid confirmation of the great persistence and consistency with which our party and government are implementing the Program of Struggle for Peace and Security of Peoples drafted at the 26th CPSU Congress. All people of good will throughout the world accepted with profound understanding the passionate appeal sounded in Moscow, an appeal for preserving peace and guaranteeing people's right to life.

Secondly, enhancement of the leadership role of the CPSU in the Armed Forces is dictated by qualitative changes in military affairs and by the strengthened bond and interlinkage between the military organization of the state and its economic, political, and cultural system. Our army, with its present structure, technical equipment, and elaborate system of command and control, is a multifaceted, highly complex social organism. It is possible successfully to direct it, to guide the efforts of many military units toward a common objective -- a high level of combat readiness -- only on the basis of unified party policy, with strict conformity of the elaborated strategy to the demands of Marxist-Leninist science.

Thirdly, enhancement of the leadership role of the CPSU in military organizational development is determined by the fact that the role of spiritual and ideological factors in strengthening national defense and the Armed Forces has grown. Only the Communist Party, its tireless indoctrinational and organizational work, and the personal example of Communists in skilled and selfless execution of military duty can guarantee a constantly increasing moral-political and psychological superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the armies of the aggressors.

Fourthly, the internationalist tasks of the Soviet Armed Forces have expanded. They are called upon to defend against aggressors not only their own country but, together with the armies of the other brother nations, the entire socialist community as well. Elaboration of collective measures to defend the world socialist system and coordination of the military efforts of the Warsaw Pact member nations are enhancing to an even greater extent the role of the CPSU and its Central Committee in directing the Soviet Armed Forces, in international indoctrination of Soviet military personnel, and in strengthening their ties with the fighting men of the armies of the nations of the socialist community.

The CPSU Central Committee reported to the 26th CPSU Congress that the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist countries is faithfully serving the cause of peace. It has at its disposal everything needed in order reliably to defend the socialist achievements of peoples. And we shall do everything in our power to ensure that this continues to be so in the future![23]

Thus enhancement of the role of CPSU direction of the Armed Forces is dictated by expansion and the increasing complexity of the tasks of military organizational development and by increased historical responsibility for the security of our homeland, the nations of the socialist community, for preserving and strengthening peace.

* * *

The 26th CPSU Congress and its resolutions are a most important event in the life of the Leninist party, the Soviet people, and all progressive mankind. The party congress clearly defined our future path in building communism. The conclusions of the congress have enriched Leninist teaching on the party. They have armed all party elements, all Communists and party-unaffiliated with a clear-cut program of action for the immediate future. Today the most important task of all Communists, the entire people and its Armed Forces is practical implementation of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 33, page 26.
2. Footnote omitted.
3. Ibid., Vol 43, page 94.
4. Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Article 6.
5. [Footnote omitted.]
6. See "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp 136-137.

7. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 68.

8. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 39, page 224.

9. [Footnote omitted.]

10. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 68.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., pp 69-70.

13. Ibid., page 71.

14. [Footnote omitted.]

15. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 73.

16. [Footnote omitted.]

17. "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1968" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents, 1917-1968], Voyenizdat, 1969, page 35.

18. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, page 512.

19. PRAVDA, 10 May 1981.

20. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 66.

21. PRAVDA, 9 May 1981.

22. Ibid., 25 March.

23. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 6.

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MARSHAL KUTAKHOV ON AIR FORCE COMBAT TRADITIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 11-18

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union Chief Mar Avn P. Kutakhov, commander in chief of the Air Force, USSR deputy minister of defense: "Faithfully Preserve and Build on the Fighting Traditions of the Soviet Air Force"]

[Text] The glorious combat combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces were forged out in the heroic struggle for the independence of our homeland, under the influence of the revolutionary traditions of the Communist Party and people.

The fighting traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy are historically established customs and moral precepts, which have become a standard of conduct of military personnel both in wartime and in time of peace. They actively induce personnel to carry out their military duty in an exemplary manner and to serve their people and the socialist homeland honorably and conscientiously. Traditions are born and develop in specific historical conditions and as a rule express the interests of corresponding classes. They are extremely reactionary in armies of imperialist nations. They are grounded on international brigandage and theft, seizure of the lands of others, suppression of national liberation movements, racism and chauvinism. On the other hand, the Soviet Armed Forces defend the interests of the world's first socialist state and vigilantly guard the labor of a people which is building communism.

CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed in the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress firm confidence that the glorious defenders of our homeland "will continue in the future reliably guarding the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people!"[1]

Total dedication to the cause of communism, boundless love for the homeland, constant readiness to come to its defense, a deep feeling of international solidarity toward the peoples of the nations of the socialist community, confidence in victory over any enemies, dedication to the military oath and military duty, love of one's unit and loyalty to its colors, respect for one's commander and protection of him in combat, mass heroism, military comradeship, collectivism, strengthening of military discipline, improvement of combat skills, political and specialized knowledge, a high degree of revolutionary vigilance and implacable opposition toward the enemies of the homeland, the forces of reaction and aggression,

the enemies of peace, progress, democracy and socialism, and brotherhood in arms -- these are those basic traditions which define the moral code of the Soviet serviceman.

Soviet military aviators solicitously preserve and build upon the fighting traditions of the USSR Armed Forces. They have a respectful attitude toward the memory of famed Russian pilots, true patriots of the homeland and genuine military aviation enthusiasts.

Russia has given aviation many skilled pilots, such as P. Nesterov, M. Yefimov, K. Artseulov, Ye. Kruten', and L. Matsiyevich, genuine experts at their job.

In the battles of World War I Russian pilots displayed exceptional heroism, ingenuity, and a boundless will to win. It is precisely these qualities which enabled them to achieve significant successes. A great many outstanding pilots were developed in the course of the war, who subsequently made a large contribution to the development of Soviet aviation. They include G. Sapozhnikov, I. Pavlov, A. Shiukov, F. Grab, plus many others.

The nucleus of aviation cadres -- pilots, engine mechanics, and ground enlisted personnel -- were from worker and peasant families, and representatives of progressive segments of the intelligentsia. The influence of the Bolsheviks became particularly strong among these personnel. It was precisely for this reason that on the first days of the Great October Socialist Revolution the majority of aviation detachments came over to the side of the Soviet authorities. Red pilots fought fearlessly against the enemies of the revolution during the civil war years. A high degree of conscientiousness and conviction over the just nature of the war against the interventionists and White Guardists redoubled their energies, inspired them to deeds and fostered the development of initiative, courage and valor.

In 1918 S. Smirnov, who emerged victorious in an engagement with four British aircraft on the Northern Front, proved himself to be an expert in aerial combat. At Tsaritsyn D. Shchekin and A. Korotkov defeated six enemy aircraft. N. Vasil'chenko fought with distinction in the spring of 1920, boldly engaging seven Vrangel' aircraft. In the fall of that same year the name of valiant pilot A. Tumanskiy was spread far and wide; piloting an Il'ya Muromets aircraft in adverse weather, he bombed an enemy airfield, destroying four of the six enemy aircraft standing on the flight line.

During the civil war years the young Soviet military aviation, with 350 aircraft at its disposal, flew 20,000 sorties and dropped approximately 100,000 kilograms of bombs on the enemy.[3] A total of 235 aviators were awarded the highest decoration at that time, the Order of the Red Banner, for heroism and combat skill. Of this total, 16 were twice decorated, while S. Monastyrev, I. Pavlov, P. Mezheraup, Ya. Moiseyev, and Ye. Ukhin were awarded this decoration three times.[4]

When the civil war came to an end, a new stage began in the development of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic. The Communist Party and Soviet Government, carrying out V. I. Lenin's instructions on defense of the socialist homeland, devoted enormous attention to the establishment of a Soviet aircraft industry and building a strong Air Force. Thousands of young people, responding to the party's appeal, entered military aviation on Komsomol authorizations. More than 30,000

Communists and Komsomol members, leading representatives of the worker class and toiling peasantry, were sent into the Air Force just in the period 1931-1936.[5]

During those years new types of fast aircraft took to the skies of the homeland, aircraft created by the innovative teams at the design offices of A. Tupolev, S. Il'yushin, V. Petlyakov, and A. Yakovlev.

Our pilots, engineers, and technicians, who were performing feats and boldly assaulting world records, were vigorously building a socialist society together with the entire Soviet people. Our people will never forget the heroic rescue of the Chelyuskin expedition and the names of the country's first Heroes of the Soviet Union, pilots A. Lyapidevskiy, S. Levanevskiy, V. Molokov, N. Kamanin, M. Slepnev, M. Vodop'yanov and I. Doronin, who rescued the expedition members from the ice and flew them back to the mainland.

The inspiring motto "Fly further, faster, and higher than anyone else" was born in the 1930's.

The record-setting flights of V. Chkalov, G. Baydukov, A. Belyakov, M. Gromov, V. Kokkinaki, A. Yumashev, S. Danilin, I. Spirin, V. Grizodubova, P. Osipenko, and M. Raskova demonstrated to the world the brilliant skill of the aviators of the Land of the Soviets and proved the superiority of Soviet aircraft over foreign-built equipment.

Soviet volunteer pilots demonstrated a high degree of ideological conviction, steadfastness, valor, and fighting skill in the skies over Spain, carrying out their international duty. A total of 160 pilots, headed by party member Ya. Smushkevich, fought heroically against the fascist aggressors, winning victories and accurately bombing and strafing the interventionist troops. N. Balanov, G. Prokof'yev, P. Rychagov, V. Khol'zunov and many others fought with particular distinction. In November 1936 alone our pilots downed 20 enemy aircraft in engagements over Madrid. A squadron under the command of A. Serov fought night engagements. On 27 July 1937 fighter pilot M. Yakushin shot down an enemy bomber at night, a historic first. The following night the pioneer of night aerial combat, A. Serov, also scored a kill. Soon I. Yeremenko, Ye. Stepanov, and I. Finn achieved victories in night engagements. Many aviators received decorations for successful accomplishment of combat missions, for courage and heroism, while 31 pilots were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The USSR offered enormous assistance to the people of China, who were fighting Japanese invaders and domestic counterrevolution. Soviet volunteer pilots inflicted heavy losses on enemy aircraft, transport ships and ground troops. The Soviet air warriors fought courageously and skillfully. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 14 of these for combat feats accomplished in the name of internationalist duty. Courageous pilot party member A. Gubenko was also awarded the Golden Order of the Republic of China. Having expended all his ammunition, he was the first to ram and destroy a Japanese aircraft in the skies above China.

The combat proficiency of Soviet pilots was also subjected to a major test in the vicinity of the Khalkhin-Gol River, when the Soviet Union came to the defense of the Mongolian People's Republic. Soviet and Mongolian aviators mercilessly

pummeled the vaunted Japanese air aces and won victories in single and group combat, displaying a high degree of organization, mutual assistance and resourcefulness. Here are just a few actual combat examples. In a period of two months, Pilot V. Rakhov fought more than 20 air engagements and personally downed seven enemy fighters. The aircraft of regimental commander Hero of the Soviet Union V. Zabaluyev was disabled over enemy territory; Zabaluyev parachuted from the disabled aircraft. Enemy aircraft headed for him. S. Gritsevich, assisted by his comrades, swiftly attacked them, then landed in full view of the Japanese, took the regimental commander on board his single-seater airplane, took off and returned safely to base. A heroic feat was accomplished by aviation regiment commissar M. Yuyukin. Antiaircraft gunners disabled his aircraft over enemy territory. Preferring death to disgraceful capture, party member Yuyukin flew his burning aircraft into the center of the enemy's weapon emplacements and killed 10 enemy soldiers.

The Japanese lost 645 aircraft in the fighting on the Khalkhin-Gol River, 590 of which were downed in air combat. Soviet losses were one ninth that figure.[6] Sixty pilots were named Hero of the Soviet Union, while three -- S. Gritsevets, G. Kravchenko, and Ya. Smushkevich -- were the first to be twice awarded this high honor. Many Soviet aviators received decorations of the Mongolian People's Republic for their fraternal combat assistance.

* * *

Indoctrination of the younger generation of air warriors in the fighting traditions helped ensure that during the years of the Great Patriotic War the excellent fighting and moral-political qualities of Soviet pilots were fully revealed -- ideological conviction and staunchness, total dedication to the cause of the Communist Party and homeland, merciless hatred of the enemy, the highest degree of heroism, exceptional bravery, military valor, nobility and an unswerving faith in victory.

Standing firmly in battle, during the very first hours of the war aerial ramming actions were performed by valiant Soviet pilots P. Ryabtsev, A. Danilov, D. Kokorev, I. Ivanov, L. Butelin, and A. Moklyak.[7] Our falcons worthily continued the combat traditions of their fathers and grandfathers. During the war years they executed approximately 500 rammings of enemy aircraft, and 17 of these heroes rammed on two occasions, while A. Khlobystov and N. Terekhin accomplished three rammings, and B. Kovzan -- four. V. Talalikhin rammed a fascist aircraft in the night sky over Moscow. Brave Komsomol lass Ye. Zelenko also frontally attacked and cut the enemy down from the skies.

Throwing the enemy into a panic, on more than 350 occasions Soviet air warriors flew their burning aircraft into concentrations of enemy personnel and equipment, fearlessly emulating the feats of the aircrews of A. Avdeyev, N. Gastello, and G. Khrapay. In 1943 A. Polyakova flew her flaming aircraft into fascist troop trains.[8]

Great admiration is evoked by the willpower, determination and persistence of wounded and even seriously wounded pilots, which they displayed in efforts to return to their regiment, to their unit's colors, and to their fellow warriors. Hero of the Soviet Union A. Mares'yev became quite famous not only in this country but abroad as well.

We shall never forget that ardent patriot and Communist, aviation division deputy commander Gen T. Tkhore, who was seriously wounded and captured. The fascists attempted to force him to betray his country. But neither their propaganda nor the most sophisticated Gestapo torture techniques could break his iron will or shake his total dedication to the socialist homeland and his loyalty to the military oath.

The skill of the Soviet pilots grew in the intense air engagements and battles, and the traditional combat mutual assistance and comradeship grew stronger. The following incident is notable. Patrolling over a Volga crossing, MSgt G. Lavrinenkov, subsequently twice Hero of the Soviet Union and colonel general aviation, spotted a group of German bombers and decided to attack them. At that moment a fighter from another regiment joined formation with him. The two aircraft headed swiftly for the enemy and shot down three bombers. The engagement over, his partner rocked his wings and was about to depart, when four enemy fighters suddenly appeared. The two Soviet aircraft once again swept to the attack, this time straight at the approaching enemy. The Hitlerites declined to engage and turned tail. Lavrinenkov never did learn the identity of his valiant partner.

Throughout the entire war Soviet aviators sacredly carried out their duty as a soldier and at all times followed the firm tradition of the Soviet Army and Navy, grounded on the principle of respect for one's commander and his protection in battle. When fighting together with their commander, pilots would protect him with their fire or aircraft and would carry him out of enemy territory following a forced landing. Flight leader S. Dolgalev landed his burning aircraft in the middle of enemy dispositions. The fascists would have captured the Soviet pilot, but his wingmen proceeded to fly a protective circle and protect their commander with machinegun and cannon fire. In the meantime one of them, M. Mikheyev, returned to their home field, returned with a PO-2 and rescued Dolgalev from enemy territory. Ground-attack aircraft pilot L. Beda, subsequently twice Hero of the Soviet Union, once had to land his disabled aircraft behind enemy lines. His wingman, A. Beresnev, without a moment's hesitation, followed him down, took both him and his gunner on board, and returned safely to base. Many such courageous deeds were performed during the Great Patriotic War.

The courageous visages of heroes of the Great Patriotic War V. Kharitonov, S. Zdorovtsev, M. Zhukov, S. Suprun, I. Polbin, T. Frunze and many other valiant Soviet pilots will be preserved forever in the grateful memory of the Soviet people. They will always serve as an example of heroism, love of the homeland, and dedication to the military duty.

A glorious page was added to the history of the war by our outstanding women pilots of the Order of Suvorov 46th Guards Taman' Aviation Regiment and the 125th Guards Bomber Regiment. Their heroism and skill, displayed in a difficult combat situation, was highly praised by the homeland. A total of 29 female pilots were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, including Ye. Bershanskaya, A. Zubkova, Ye. Nikulina, Ye. Nosal', Ye. Rudneva, O. Sanfirova, N. Fedutenko, and M. Chechneva.

Our engineers, technicians, mechanics, communications personnel, and aviation rear services specialists performed yeoman service. Their complex and difficult job demanded enormous effort, steadfastness, courage and stamina. Excellent knowledge of the equipment and the ability to repair damage quickly and well promoted

successful accomplishment of combat missions. Subjected to enemy bombing and strafing, in the cold and rain, in the dark of night and the searing heat of noon, they readied aircraft for operation, providing comprehensive support to aviation unit activities, and also would take weapon in hand and fight off attack by enemy units and subunits which had penetrated to the airfields.

During the war years engineer-technician personnel repaired and restored to service many thousands of damaged aircraft. Aviation rear services units prepared 8,500 airfields for operations, delivered more than 31 million bombs and approximately 1,600,000 tons of fuel and lubricants.[9]

An important role in achieving victories was played by political workers who, together with the commanders, worked hard to strengthen feelings of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, instilled in the men a burning hatred of the enemy and an unbending will to win, and mobilized personnel for selfless struggle against the German-fascist invaders. Publicity of combat traditions was extensively undertaken in the Air Force during those years. For this purpose examples were selected which exerted influence on the aviators and promoted development of qualities needed by the air warriors.

Dissemination of the experience of leading regimental commanders, squadron and flight leaders, the feats of pilots, officers and enlisted personnel of the engineer-technical service and aviation rear services became a fine tradition. A special role in party political work was assigned to instilling loyalty to the unit's colors -- sacred symbol of a military unit, its valor and fame. Military aviators honorably carried their combat banners, stained with the blood of their comrades, through all the battles of the Great Patriotic War.

Many political workers skillfully combined combat activity with party-political work. Maj Gen Avn S. Romazanov, deputy commander for political affairs of the 2d Air Army, enjoyed considerable fame at the front. Romazanov possessed inexhaustible energy, a keen party sense, and tactfulness. Within a single day's time he could visit several airfields, flying a PO-2, study the state of affairs in the various subunits, address personnel and brief the pilots on specific combat missions. V. Shabanov, deputy commander for political affairs of the 162d Fighter Regiment, was also an outstanding political worker. He had the ability to raise the men's morale not only with ardent party words but also with concrete combat deeds. V. Shabanov flew several combat sorties each day. Not having a regular wingman, he was happy to take any of the pilots along and show them in actual combat conditions, using himself as an example, what the air warrior should be.

Political workers, states Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, were the heart and soul of the Soviet Armed Forces. "They carried to our servicemen the word of the party and inspired them to heroic and selfless combat. From political commissar to Military Council member -- they could always be found where the going was hardest, fortifying the men's faith in the triumph of our just cause, instilling courage, willpower and fearlessness in the men."[10]

The Air Force made a large contribution toward the defeat of the hated enemy. During the war years more than 3 million combat sorties were flown, more than 30 million bombs were dropped, and enormous casualties and equipment losses were

inflicted on the enemy. Air Force, Navy, and National Air Defense Fighter Aviation pilots destroyed 57,000 German-fascist aircraft in aerial combat and on the ground.

More than 200,000 persons were awarded decorations and medals, 2,420 of whom were awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union; 65 pilots were awarded this title twice, while two -- now Mar Avn A. I. Pokryshkin and Col Gen Avn I. N. Kozhedub -- three times.[11]

The birth of the air guards was an indicator of the excellent courage and skill of our pilots. On 6 December 1941 six of the best aviation units, which had distinguished themselves in combat against the German-fascist invaders, were renamed guards units. The 29th Red-Banner Fighter Regiment, one of the oldest in the Soviet Air Force, was the first of the 288 frontal aviation and long-range bomber combined units, units and subunits to be given the guards appellation.[12] Its combat chronicle began with the aviation detachment under the command of eminent Russian pilot P. Nesterov. The fighting men of the guards units always were and will continue to be worthy successors of the heroic traditions of the glorious revolutionary guard.

* * *

In the postwar period, in conditions of profound qualitative changes in the area of military technology, in the character and modes of warfare, higher demands were imposed on combat proficiency of military personnel, their moral-political qualities, psychological steadfastness and physical endurance. But even today man remains the principal and determining force.

Combat traditions are a powerful means of forming excellent moral and fighting qualities in Soviet servicemen. The CPSU Central Committee decree of 26 April 1979, entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," placed special emphasis on the necessity of building upon the glorious traditions of the army and navy, service in which constitutes an outstanding school of labor and military proficiency, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

Today's reality is filled with vivid examples of display by aviators of a high degree of ideological conviction, conscientiousness, selflessness, and genuine heroism. The present generation of aviators are worthy successors of the combat fame of the war veterans. Having taken over for the veterans, whose names and deeds are inscribed in the combat chronicle of the Air Force, Air Force personnel are preserving and building upon the combat traditions of their senior comrades in arms. They are demonstrating their loyalty to heroic traditions by their practical deeds and by selfless service to the homeland.

Fighter pilot G. Yeliseyev performed a ramming action in peacetime, defending Soviet airspace. He was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The highest degree of patriotism, moral qualities, courage and valor are also displayed by Soviet pilots in daily routine activities. An engine failed during a test flight of a regular production aircraft. Pilot B. Ryabtsev was ordered to eject, but he refused to comply: the aircraft might come down in a congested urban

area. The pilot was killed, but he did everything he could to save people's lives.

Publicity and dissemination of combat traditions, successes by aviators achieved in routine training and at training exercises, examples of courage and heroism displayed in difficult conditions during the performance of air missions, and broad dissemination of the experience and know-how of socialist competition leaders constitute most important elements in the indoctrination work performed in the Air Force.

An important role in the dissemination of combat traditions is played by museums, combat glory rooms, unit history rooms, honor rolls, ceremonies honoring the memory of heroes who died fighting for their country, field trips to famous battle sites, and get-togethers with war veterans, war and labor heroes, and experts in military affairs.

A positive effect is produced on the men in the process of indoctrination by military rituals -- trooping the unit's colors, the swearing-in ceremony, award of decorations, guards emblems, and shoulder boards in a military rank promotion ceremony, mounting and relieving of the guard, inspection parades, evening roll call, etc. Also of great significance are letters of thanks from the command to parents and organizations which have indoctrinated loyal sons of the homeland and worthy successors of the glorious deeds of their grandfathers and fathers.

One of the most honored rewards for military personnel is the presentation of a personal photograph of a serviceman taken alongside his unit's unfurled colors.

Also promoting the military-patriotic indoctrination of Air Force personnel is the fine tradition of celebrating each year the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet Army and Navy, Victory Day, and USSR Air Force Day. Socialist pledges are made in the Air Force in honor of these important dates, pledges which serve as a stimulus in the campaign to achieve further improvement in quality of training, more effective accomplishment of combat and political training tasks, and which mobilize personnel to improve their combat readiness.

Another fine tradition has become firmly established in the postwar period -- the fighting alliance with the armies of the brother socialist nations. This friendship, born in the joint struggle against fascism, will remain forever an indissoluble alliance, a reliable bulwark of peace and socialism. We selflessly share with one another everything we possess in the area of military affairs: experience and know-how in troop training and indoctrination, military scientific research results, aircraft and weapons.

The content of the diversified ideological and organizational activities of commanders and staffs, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations is determined first and foremost by the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, CPSU Central Committee plenums and decrees, recommendations and conclusions of the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated in the Report to 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "The sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War today stand in the ranks of defenders of the

homeland. They have not experienced the severe tests which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And whenever the interests of national security and defense of the peace demand it, whenever it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman appears before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to surmount any and all difficulties."[13]

Awareness by military aviator personnel that they are serving in the Air Force, which is rich in combat traditions, and that the homeland has entrusted first-class modern weapons to their care and has entrusted them with defense of the peaceful Soviet skies impels them to work hard to achieve excellent results in combat and political training.

Standing solidly behind the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, and true to their fine combat traditions, military aviators, just as all Soviet Armed Forces personnel, are ready at all times honorably to carry out their sacred patriotic and internationalist duty.

The greatest concern over the heightened military danger and unprecedented scale of the arms race was expressed in Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's address at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in the Appeal by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World, adopted at that session, which stated: "Ensuring peace always has been, is now and will continue to be the highest goal of the foreign policy of the Soviet state. The Peace Program for the 1980's, adopted at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is aimed at this."[14]

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 66.

2. *[Footnote omitted.]*

3. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 2, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 202-203.

4. Ibid., page 203.

5. "Kommunisticheskaya partiya -- sozdatel' i rukovoditel' VVS" [The Communist Party -- Creator and Leader of the Air Force], Monino, Izd. VVA, 1966, page 90.

6. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 7, 1977, page 22.

7. "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], Voyenizdat, 1968, pp 33-35.

8. "Vozdushnyy Flot Strany Sovetov" [Air Force of the Soviet Nation], Moscow, 1979, page 7; PRAVDA, 15 August and 29 October 1974; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1978, page 5.

9. AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA, No 5, 1977, page 2.

10. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 29.

11. "Soviet Military Encyclopedia," Vol 2, pp 204-205.

12. "Sovetskiye Voyenno-Vozdushnyye...," op. cit., page 447.

13. "Materialy...," op. cit., page 66.

14. PRAVDA, 24 June 1981.

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THE FRONT GROUP IN WARTIME STRATEGIC OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 19-25

[Article, published under the heading "The Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," by Docent Col Gen V. Karpov: "Operations of a Group of Fronts as the Basic Form of Accomplishing Strategic Tasks in a Theater of Military Operations"]

[Text] In the prewar period a future war was viewed by Soviet art of warfare as a protracted and high-mobility war, requiring the participation of mass armies and an enormous exertion of all economic and moral resources. It was believed that victory in such a war could not be achieved with a single offensive strike. "Modern armies," stated M. V. Frunze, "possess immense survivability.... Even a total defeat of the adversary's armies achieved at a specific moment in time does not guarantee final victory, since the defeated units are backed up by an economically strong home front buoyed by high morale."[1]

A theory of preparation for and conduct of an offensive operation in depth was elaborated in conformity with these views; the principal points of this theory boiled down to the following. In combat against a powerful adversary, a war cannot be won with the conduct of one or several simultaneous operations. "A number of sequentially conducted devastating operations, linked by continuous pursuit, can replace that devastating battle which was the best type of combat encounter in past armies...," wrote M. N. Tukhachevskiy.[2]

The operation in depth was conceived as an operation providing for hitting the adversary simultaneously to the entire depth of his tactical order of battle. At a conference of top-echelon command personnel in December 1940, People's Commissar of Defense Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko noted that World War II, which was in its initial stages, had introduced many new elements into one's conception of the nature and modes of conduct of operations. In conditions of fronts extending thousands of kilometers, along which military operations were in progress, with troops heavily armed with modern weaponry, "one must bear in mind the possibility of simultaneous conduct of two and even three offensive operations by different fronts in a single theater, with the intention of strategically cracking the enemy's defense capability along as wide a frontage as possible."[3] Before shifting to large-scale offensive operations, however, the Red Army was compelled to accomplish defensive tasks at the beginning of the last war.

A characteristic feature of the strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War was its aggressive character and subordination to the main type of combat action -- the attack.

From the very first days of the aggression by fascist Germany against the USSR, our High Command had to resolve the problem of conducting strategic defensive operations along the entire Soviet-German front. As a result the enemy's force groupings as a rule lost their offensive capabilities, the battle line stabilized, and favorable conditions were created for shifting to a counteroffensive and seizing the strategic initiative.

The first defensive operations on strategic axes were conducted by front formations. Their experience indicated, however, that in order to accomplish strategic missions it was necessary to concentrate the efforts not of one but as a rule of several fronts.

The Kursk strategic defensive operation was the summit of the art of organization of a strategic defense; three large front formations took part in this operation. In contrast to previous defensive operations, at Kursk the Soviet troops shifted to the defense not because they were forced to do so, but deliberately.

The experience of the war graphically demonstrated that strategic defense is just as logical a form of actions by military forces as is offense. Meriting attention in this connection is the question of the objectives of strategic defense during the Great Patriotic War.

During the war the following were considered to be the objectives of the majority of defensive operations of a front group: repelling an enemy attack, defeating the enemy, and creating conditions for shifting to aggressive offensive actions. One would state that similar objectives could also be pursued by a present-day strategic defensive operation in a theater. In view of the fact that the potential adversaries maintain large combat-ready force groupings along the borders of the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community in peacetime, repelling a sneak-attack invasion by these forces will be one of the most important problems. Creation of conditions for our forces to shift from the defense to a decisive counteroffensive in order to defeat the aggressor in detail may prove to be a no less important task.

Also valuable is the experience of the war in massing men and weapons and concentrating efforts on holding important strategic installations, areas and positions, the successful holding of which determined the outcome of a defensive operation. Such objectives included Moscow in the Moscow defensive operation, and Stalingrad in the Stalingrad Operation. At the same time, today it is just as important not only to determine how to dispose a defensive force but also to specify possible different versions of aggressive conduct of a defensive operation and creation of favorable conditions for turning from the defense to decisive offensive actions.

A counteroffensive signaled the commencement of the winter offensive campaigns of 1941/42 and 1942/43, as well as the summer-fall campaign of 1943. It subsequently developed into a general strategic offensive along most or all of the Soviet-German front. In subsequent campaigns a strategic offensive was conducted practically

continuously, by mounting a number of sequential operations parallel with and perpendicular to the front by front groups (the Donbass and Smolensk in 1943, the Iasi-Kishinev and Budapest in 1944, the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian in 1945 -- two fronts; the Moscow, Stalingrad, Berlin, Prague and Manchurian -- three fronts; operations to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine and Belorussia -- four fronts).

The past war as a whole confirmed the correctness of the basic points of theory elaborated by Soviet military strategy in the prewar years on problems of the strategic offensive, and also introduced many new elements into their further development.

The strategic offensive operation of a front group during the Great Patriotic War comprised an aggregate of interlinked operations of front formations, operations and combat actions of formations and combined units, long-range bomber aviation, and National Air Defense Troops, and on coastal axes -- naval forces, conducted according to a unified plan for the purpose of achieving a strategic objective.

Following were typical objectives of strategic offensive operations: defeat in detail of large enemy forces totaling 20-30 divisions[4] and more; capture of politically, economically and militarily important areas and lines. The objectives of a number of strategic operations in 1944 consisted in routing large enemy forces and taking fascist Germany's satellites out of the war -- the Kingdom of Romania, Mannerheim Finland, Horthy Hungary, and Czarist Bulgaria. We liberated one of our allies, Poland, in the course of the Vistula-Oder and East Pomeranian operations. The objectives of such operations as the Vienna and Prague were the crushing of large enemy forces and the capture of the Austrian and Czechoslovakian capitals. In the Berlin Operation Soviet troops quickly defeated in detail the main forces of army groups Vistula and center, and captured Berlin. This deprived fascist Germany of the capability to offer further organized resistance and forced it to accept terms of unconditional surrender.

As the economic capabilities of the Soviet state became greater and the Soviet Armed Forces grew in strength, increasingly larger forces were employed in front group offensive operations, totaling from 600,000 to 2.5 million men, from 8,000 to 40,000 guns and mortars, from 700 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and from 700 to 7,000 aircraft.[5]

Accomplishment of the following tasks constituted the principal content of the strategic offensive operation: penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense and defeat in detail of the forces of the enemy's forward operational echelon; offensive operation at operational depth and crushing defeat of enemy operational reserves; capture of important ground, repelling of attacks by strategic reserves, and completion of the operation with forces shifting to the defense in the attained final position in order to prepare for the subsequent strategic operation.

Successful employment of various modes of conduct of operations was one of the characteristic features of the advanced Soviet art of warfare.

Launching a massive, surprise initial offensive thrust and penetration of the tactical defense in narrow sectors at a rapid pace became the principal mode of actions at the commencement of an operation, ensuring successful penetration of a

static defense and the defeat of large enemy forces. In the Belorussian offensive operation of 1944, for example, a rifle division was breaking through the defense in a sector with a frontage of 2-2.5 km. From 40 to 60 percent of the tanks were assigned the mission of close support of infantry, which made it possible to concentrate from 10 to 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer of breakthrough frontage. The infantry and tank assault was preceded by heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery density reached 200 guns and mortars (76 mm and larger) per kilometer of frontage.

Of decisive importance for subsequent offensive exploitation was the commitment of powerful mobile groups (tank armies, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps) into the breach and mounting of swift and deep offensive thrusts against withdrawing troops and reserves by these groups, working in coordination with air. Encirclement of large enemy forces was achieved, forces which were subsequently split up and destroyed piecemeal.

A classic example of such actions is the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad, during which tank, mechanized and cavalry corps were engaged in order to complete penetration, to accomplish swift offensive exploitation, and to encircle the enemy forces at operational depth. These mobile combined units avoided becoming involved in drawn-out battles with the enemy and advanced 50-70 km during some 24-hour periods. As a result of their actions, the ring of encirclement was closed on the fifth day of the operation, trapping a German-fascist force totaling 330,000 officers and men.

Encirclement was one of the principal modes of conduct of many large-scale operations. In the course of the war Soviet troops surrounded and defeated in detail more than 200 enemy combined units.[6] This was accomplished by the following: penetration of the enemy's defense on two or several axes, with subsequent offensive exploitation along converging axes (the Stalingrad, Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy, L'vov, and Iasi-Kishinev operations); by mounting a single powerful enveloping thrust, with the objective of pinning the enemy against a natural obstacle (the East Prussian Operation); by means of bypassing large, densely populated areas and cities and preventing the escape of enemy garrisons from these areas (Breslau, Poznan, etc). Encirclement of large enemy operational formations at considerable depth as a result of operational pursuit is of particular interest. In the course of the Belorussian Operation in June 1944, for example, more than 100,000 enemy troops were surrounded in an area East of Minsk at a depth of 200 km.[7]

Annihilation of encircled enemy forces would be accomplished rapidly (in two or three days in the Vitebsk and Bobruysk areas, and in seven days east of Minsk). Various methods of conduct were combined with considerable success in several front group operations. Particularly instructive was the Belorussian Operation, in which the enemy's defense was to be penetrated simultaneously in six sectors, with encirclement and annihilation of enemy flank forces in the Vitebsk and Bobruysk areas, with defeat in detail of the enemy's Orsha and Mogilev forces. In the East Pomeranian Operation, splitting of the enemy's defense was accomplished by drives to the sea launched by two fronts.

The power of the initial attack in the execution of strategic offensive operations during the war depended primarily on skillful selection of the main axis of advance, decisive concentration of efforts, and the establishment of high

densities of weapons and troops in the breakthrough sectors, which ensured a substantial superiority over the enemy: 2-5-fold in personnel, 3-6-fold in tanks, and 4-10-fold in artillery. We must note that in present-day conditions as well, in spite of the employment of fundamentally new weaponry, the principle of massing main efforts at the decisive point and time has not lost its significance. At the same time, massing of men and weapons is today inseparably linked with the necessity of dispersing them in case of threat of nuclear attack. In other words, today troops should move dispersed but fight together.

In the course of offensive operations the Soviet Armed Forces successfully solved the problem of penetrating an enemy static defense disposed in depth and conduct of an offensive to great depth. As the nation's military-economic capabilities increased, with a steady strengthening of the power of Soviet troops and accumulation of combat experience, the spatial scope of offensive operations grew. In the largest of these operations (the operation to liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine, in the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Baltic, Vistula-Oder, and Berlin operations), the offensive front reached 500-1000 km. The depth of operations in the first period of the war amounted to 150-200 km, and 500-700 km in the second and third periods of the war.

Simultaneously with an increase in spatial scope, there was an increase in rate of advance and decrease in the duration of operations. In the first period of the war the rate of advance was usually 10-15 km per day, while in the second and third period, when the fronts received powerful means of offensive exploitation (tank armies, mechanized and tank corps) and air superiority was achieved, the rate of advance increased to 20-30 km. During certain periods of the Manchurian Operation, the rate of advance exceeded 80 km per day. The duration of operations ranged from 10 days to 2 months or more.

Of great importance for the conduct of present-day operations at a rapid pace and to considerable depth is innovative utilization of the experience of employment of tank armies with the objective of offensive exploitation and defeat in detail of enemy reserves at depth. During the Great Patriotic War, following engagement as front mobile groups, tank armies as a rule would operate in separation from the combined-arms formations. This separation distance frequently exceeded 70-80 km. Their average daily rate of advance ranged from 20 to 40 km, and reached 50-80 km and more in the Vistula-Oder and Manchurian operations. Massive employment of tank formations and combined units played a major role in achieving operational and strategic objectives.

An important achievement of Soviet military strategy in the Great Patriotic War was the fact that the majority of front group operations, especially in 1944-1945, were interlinked and comprised a unified system of operations conducted simultaneously or sequentially over the greater part of the Soviet-German front. This forced the enemy to move forces from one sector to another and made it possible to destroy enemy forces piecemeal. The most vivid examples of the conduct of front sequential operations are the operations of 1944, and front simultaneous operations -- those of 1945. The Iasi-Kishinev, Belgrade, and Budapest operations are an example of depth-sequential operations. At the same time the experience of the Great Patriotic War indicates that in a number of instances pauses occurred between offensive operations, pauses which lasted from two to four months. These were essential in order to ensure thorough and comprehensive operation preparations.

In those cases where a pause occurred between operations, usually the sequential method of planning would be employed. With this method Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC) first requested observations of the fronts and their representatives, who were coordinating their actions. Then a concept and plan would be drawn up taking into account the presented observations and prevailing situation, and directives would be issued, specifying the objectives of the new operations, and specific missions would be assigned to front formations, long-range bomber aviation, and to naval forces on coastal axes; the requisite manpower and material resources would be allocated.

Sometimes front formations, having been assigned specific missions for the offensive, would draw up corresponding operation plans, usually two or three weeks prior to launching the operation, plans which would be carefully reviewed and approved by HQ SHC. As soon as specific missions would be received by the fronts, formations and combined units of the armed services, immediate preparation for the operations would be carried out.

The problem of strategic coordination between force groupings was successfully resolved during preparation for and in the course of front group operations in the Great Patriotic War. As a rule coordination would be organized by HQ SHC in the interests of the Ground Forces. Particular attention would be focused on coordinating the actions of the forces of the fronts on the main axis of advance: in detail to the depth of the immediate objectives of the fronts during offense, and in defensive operations for the period of repelling an enemy attack and combat for the tactical and operational defense zones. The fundamentals of cooperation and teamwork would be laid down by HQ SHC when working up operation concepts.

The experience of organizing cooperation in the Berlin offensive operation is particularly instructive.

HQ SHC grounded organization of cooperation and teamwork on the operation plan, which called for launching several powerful simultaneous and sequential offensive thrusts on a broad front, surrounding and simultaneously splitting up the Berlin force into segments and destroying each of these segments separately.

The troops of the First Belorussian Front launched the main attack directly at Berlin from the Kuestrin bridgehead, with the forces of six armies. Subsidiary attacks were to be mounted to the north and south of Berlin. Two tank armies were to be committed following penetration of the defense (capture of the Seelow hills), to execute offensive exploitation, executing a wide envelopment of Berlin on the north and northeast. In order to gain the element of surprise, infantry and tanks were to begin the assault during hours of darkness, following a 30-minute artillery bombardment, with the terrain to be illuminated by searchlights. The First Ukrainian Front launched the main attack south of Berlin with its right flank. There were two variants for utilizing tank armies. According to one of these, the tank armies would advance into an area 30-35 km southwest of Berlin, while with the other version these armies would drive directly on Berlin from the south, in coordination with the troops of the First Belorussian Front.

The Second Belorussian Front, shifting to the offensive four days later, was to crush the enemy force operating north of Berlin. The Baltic Fleet assisted the

advance of the troops of this front along the seacoast and attacked sea lines of communication with aircraft and submarines. An air army was assigned to each front to provide air support to the ground troops.

Coordination with the National Air Defense Forces was organized with their defensive employment to defend installations in the front's rear areas. This made it possible to utilize a front's air defense assets to provide immediate air cover for its formations.

Coordination with Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian and Czechoslovak units and combined units, which took part in the front group operations in the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, was achieved by means of personal meetings and direct contacts between their commanders, as well as by coordinating the operations of ground troops by Allied army command groups. This ensured that everybody had the same understanding of the missions and guaranteed purposeful control during joint actions in the course of operations.

Direct HQ SHC control of fronts and fleets was the most widespread form of direction of strategic operations. HQ SHC representatives would be designated to coordinate the operations of fronts and fleets. In certain situations, in order to bring strategic command closer to the combat troops, intermediate strategic command elements would be established between HQ SHC and the front groups. In July 1941, for example, under conditions of an extremely rapidly changing and complex situation, high commands were formed in the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern sectors, and in the Manchurian Strategic Operation -- the Soviet High Command in the Far East which, in conformity with the strategic plan drawn up by HQ SHC for defeating the Kwantung Army, handled immediate control of the operations of the Transbaykal, First and Second Far Eastern fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Flotilla. Organization of such a system of command and control proved effective and enabled the Soviet command authorities to improve efficiency of troop control and coordination of troop actions.

Study of the experience of strategic command and control of front group operations in various situations is of theoretical and practical significance for present-day conditions, when the scope of operations, the volume and content of strategic missions have substantially increased.

Thus experience in preparing for and conducting operations of front groups in the Great Patriotic War constituted a significant step forward in development of Soviet art of warfare, which was based on the increasing combat capability of the arsenal of weapons. Operations of front groups, however, in spite of their large scope, usually did not encompass in frontage an entire theater, but as a rule were limited to one or two strategic axes and boiled down most frequently to ground forces operations.

* * *

In conclusion we must stress that the extensive experience of the Great Patriotic War in preparation for and conduct of operations of front groups has also retained its significance for organization of present-day strategic operations. It merits further, more thorough study and theoretical interpretation. Proceeding from the

nature of a future war, meriting particular attention is the study of such problems as the following: the endeavor to seize and hold the strategic initiative; utilization of strategic reserves; ensuring a rapid rate of advance and supporting the actions of force groupings in conditions of rapid and abrupt situation changes; comprehensive support of troop combat activities; achievement of secrecy and concealment in preparing for operations; maintaining a high level of moral-political state of personnel. Of exceptional value is the wealth of experience in organizing party-political work during preparation for and execution of strategic operations. One of the central tasks of military-historical science and of Soviet military science as a whole is to study thoroughly the leadership role of the Communist Party in the area of utilization of all the material, military and moral capabilities of the state in order to achieve victory over the enemy.

FOOTNOTES

1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voyenizdat, 1950, page 253.

2. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya," Vol 1, Voyenizdat, 1964, page 142.

3. Concluding speech by USSR People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko at a military conference on 31 December 1940, Voyenizdat, 1941, page 30.

4. "Voyennoye iskusstvo vo vtoroy mirovoy voyne" [Art of Warfare in World War II], Moscow, Izd. Voyennoy akademii General'nogo shtaba, 1973, page 219.

5. Ibid., page 204.

6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1978, page 37.

7. Ibid., Vol 1, 1976, page 432.

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WARTIME REAR SERVICE SUPPORT OF ARMIES ON THE DEFENSE

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[Article, published under the heading "The Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War," by Docent and Doctor of Military Sciences Col V. Odintsov, and Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Ovsyannikov: "Trends in the Development of Rear Service Support in Army Defensive Operations Based on the Experience of the War"]

[Text] Rear services support of troops, as we know, comprises an aggregate of measures aimed at meeting the supply, transportation, daily routine and other troop needs in order to maintain them in a state of combat readiness to conduct combat operations or perform daily routine tasks. In the course of the war a well-structured and rather flexible system of rear services support of troops was established in the Soviet Army, including in defensive operations. The composition of army rear services and the modes of their utilization changed as the defense evolved and the process of rear services support proper was improved.

The structure of rear services support during the war years was called "army basing."[1] This term covered first and foremost the deployment of the field supply depots of armies, as well as their hospital facilities and other rear services units and establishments.

The basing of combined-arms armies at the beginning of the war was performed according to the procedures worked out in the prewar years.[2] An independent railway section would be designated for army basing. A regulating station and supply station (one each for each rifle corps and army aviation combined units) would be designated in this section. A complement of forward supply depots (approximately 7-8) would be deployed in the vicinity of a supply station designated for servicing a rifle corps. In addition, other army rear services units and establishments would be deployed in the vicinity of supply stations, disposed to a depth of up to 250 km. Materiel would be hauled from supply stations to corps exchange points along specially equipped unsurfaced roads.

A more dynamic basing of armies would be specified for rear service support of troops conducting a mobile defense. In this case army forward supply depots would contain smaller quantities of supplies. It was recommended that excess supplies be transferred in advance to new supply stations. In order to deploy them on

schedule, the draft rear services regulations specified maintaining reserve manpower and equipment. During rebasing, front headquarters would designate for an army a new railway line of communication, a regulating station and supply stations (based on the number of corps). A special plan had to be drawn up to cover possible withdrawal of troops, which would specify the procedure of basing combined units for different variants of withdrawal, preparation and equipping of routes for withdrawal of rear services, procedure and sequence of displacement of rear services, etc.

Thus in the prewar period problems of basing armies were worked out taking into account the requirements of the theory and practice of army defensive operations.

Combat operations to repel the treacherous attack by fascist Germany began in conditions of absence of army and front rear services, the manpower requirements of which had not been provided in peacetime. Deployment of rear services in the frontier military districts (fronts) according to the mobilization plan was a virtual failure. This task was being carried out in conditions of savage defensive engagements against superior enemy forces and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops into the Soviet heartland.

In such a difficult situation, it was necessary to deploy army rear services on the basis of the few peacetime district fixed-location rear services units and establishments. In particular, existing district supply depots became the forward army supply depots. The Southwestern Front, for example, transferred over to the 5th, 6th, 26th, and 12th armies district supply depots with all current and mobilization stocks, which were located in the areas of deployment of these armies and which were situated within their rear boundaries. Like measures were carried out on the other fronts.

In connection with the enemy's rapid advance and rapid situation change, modes of deployment of army rear services and their activities in support of defensive operations elaborated in the prewar years were no longer in conformity with their character. The army rear services did not support in full measure mobile action of the combat troops.

An extremely adverse situation was developing for rear services operations. When mobile enemy groups would penetrate to operational depth, rear services units and establishments would frequently come under attack or end up surrounded. During mobile defensive actions, army rear services units and establishments would be in movement a substantial part of the time, and their cumbersomeness and inadequate mobility were being felt increasingly acutely. For this reason, when the strength of armies was reduced in August-September 1941, their rear services were also reorganized. NKO [People's Commissar of Defense] Order No 290, dated 2 September 1941, specified in place of 24-25 field supply depots in the armies, a field army base (PAB), which included 7-8 field supply depots, as well as subunits for loading, unloading and security. Cumbersome railway shops -- artillery, armored, motor transport, etc -- were transferred from the army to the front rear services.

In order to improve rear services control, an NKO order dated 1 August 1941 called for establishment in all armies of a rear services directorate headed by the army rear services chief, who was designated deputy commander. The position of deputy

chief of staff for rear services and the rear services department at army headquarters were abolished.

Consequently, there was already at the beginning of the war a tendency toward cutting back the complement of the army rear services and improving rear services control in order to give them greater mobility. During defensive operations there occurred further development of the principles of rear services support. In the Battle of Moscow, for example, the armies of the Western Front were designated rear areas not more than 100 km in depth,[3] that is, half the depth required according to prewar views. Not all armies received independent railway sections for their basing. In October 1941, for example, only the 22d and 29th armies were assigned independent railway sections. The 30th, 19th, 16th, and 20th armies were based into a single section (Vyaz'ma, Durovo Station, Dorogobuzh), which also passed through the rear areas of the 19th and 16th armies.[4] In this section 1-2 supply stations or railhead stations were designated for each army. Supplies would be transported directly to these stations from front supply depots, designated to the combined units.

This situation was due chiefly to the poorly developed network of rail lines in the area of operations, as well as the comparatively narrow defensive frontage of the armies. The 19th, 16th, and 20th Armies, for example, defended in zones ranging from 40 to 50 km in width. A similar phenomenon was also observed in the defensive operations near Moscow in November 1941. Here the 5th, 33d, and 43d armies of the Western Front were assigned defensive areas ranging from 30 to 40 km in frontage. The same tendency was observed in the course of the defensive operations at Stalingrad and Kursk, as well as at Lake Balaton. Nor did all armies have separate railway sections for basing in the defensive operations at Stalingrad. The 62d and 38th armies of the Stalingrad Front, for example, were based to the single Bakhtiyarovka-Gumrak railway section, while the 64th and 28th armies were based to the Gumrak-Voroponovo-Krivomuzginskaya section.

Later, in connection with the increasing complexity of the operational situation and an insufficiency of rail lines, an order dated 3 September 1942 pertaining to the rear services of the Stalingrad Front stipulated designating only supply stations and railhead stations rather than railway sections for basing armies. The correctness of this decision was confirmed by the entire subsequent experience of the war. In the defensive operations in the Kursk area there was also noted a trend away from designating army supply stations. For example, the limited number of rail lines in the zone of the Central Front and their peculiar distribution dictated the necessity of locating two supply stations for the 13th Army in the rear area of the 65th Army, while two supply stations of the 65th Army were located in the rear area of the 60th Army.

It became obvious with the establishment of FAB that it was inadvisable to maintain army regulating stations, since their functions were performed by the supply base headquarters. This was first evident in defensive operations in the Moscow area. A directive issued by the rear services chief of the Western Front to the 5th and 33d armies dated 11 November 1941 designated regulating stations east of Moscow (Orekhovo-Zuyevo and Kurovskaya).[5] But the supplies for these armies were routed along the rail line from front supply depots deployed west of Moscow. Therefore supplies were in fact moving to the supply stations designated directly to the army combined units, bypassing the regulating stations. The regulating stations in the

armies were abolished by subsequent NKO Order No 12, dated 15 January 1942.

Reduction in the depth of the army rear areas and change in the character of defensive operations brought rear services units and establishments closer to the battle line. In the Battle of Moscow, for example, some rear services units and establishments in the armies of the Western Front were deployed in the vicinity of the railhead station, 20-25 km from the forward edge of the battle area. This made it possible more efficiently to utilize animal-drawn and motor transport for hauling supplies.

A trend toward bringing army rear services units and establishments closer to the combat troops was also evident in the defensive operations at Stalingrad. For example, in connection with the fact that combat troops were situated at a considerable distance from rail lines, forward sections of army supply depots were set up right in the field in the vicinity of Kondrashi, Ivanovka, and Gorno-Vodyanoye to shorten the supply run for the 1st Guards, 24th and 66th armies of the Stalingrad Front. PAB forward sections, which were a prototype of the new organizational structure of the army rear services, first began operating here.

During the period of direct fighting for Stalingrad the principal army supply depots were moved forward and were situated 10-15 km, and in some armies (62d and 64th) 2-3 km from the troops. Army supply depot sections were deployed in the troop dispositions. Rear services support for the principal categories of supplies was handled according to an army-regiment arrangement, bypassing division exchange points.

This was due to the following. At the beginning of the defense of Stalingrad all supplies for the 62d Army were delivered by army transport to crossing points on the east bank of the Volga. The combined units and units should have moved the supplies across the river. But in practice things frequently worked out differently. Units, having lost river-crossing equipment to hostile fire, sometimes would be without ammunition and rations, while the army, having deposited the required supplies on the east bank, was under the impression that the troops were supplied with everything they needed.

In view of this situation, the army military council assigned responsibility for moving supplies across the Volga to the army rear services. As a result it became necessary to organize army supply depot sections on the right bank of the Volga, that is, in the troop combat formations. This in turn brought a change in the procedure of hauling supplies which had been adopted on the basis of prewar views.

By a special order on the front rear services dated 6 September 1942, responsibility for hauling supplies was assigned as follows: up to field army bases -- to the front rear services chief; from PAB to division supply depots -- to the army rear services chief; from division supply depots to the regiments -- to the division deputy commander for rear services. In June 1943, by decision of the State Defense Committee, such a supply hauling procedure was established for the entire army in the field, that is, responsibility for hauling all categories of supplies to lower echelons was assigned to the higher rear services commander.

There was also a trend toward bringing rear services closer to the combat troops in the defensive operations in the Kursk area. While in the 48th, 13th and 70th armies, for example, PAB were located 60-100 km from the forward edge of the battle area at the commencement of the operation, the distance was 30-60 km in the 60th and 65th armies. This was due to the fact that these armies were defending in secondary sectors. In addition, rear services units and establishments of the 38th and 40th armies of the Voronezh Front were deployed in their rear areas.

A defense dispositioned in depth made it necessary to dispose army rear services in depth, with the aim of ensuring the self-contained operation of each of its elements. In the 13th Army, for example, the army rear services contained two echelons. The first echelon, consisting of sections of the principal supply depots, mobile field hospitals and certain shops, was situated 15-25 km from the battle line. The bulk of rear services personnel and facilities were assigned to the second echelon. They were positioned at a distance of 60-80 km from the forward edge of the battle area.

The changes which were taking place in army basing also inevitably affected subsequent development of road support services. At the beginning of the war there was noted a trend toward concentrating principal troop efforts on organization and equipping of one or two military motor transport roads in an army's zone in place of numerous unimproved sections. This was due to many factors. They include the elimination of corps in the armies (they were reestablished in 1943) and the formation, in place of a large number of separate supply depots, of army bases, which had to be reliably linked to the combined units by military motor transport roads.

Military motor transport roads in the armies first began to be organized in the defensive operations at Moscow. At the beginning of the fighting at Stalingrad, in July 1942, armies were still being assigned 3-5 unimproved sections. But in connection with difficult road conditions (absence of hard-surface roads, sandy terrain) and limited road repair and traffic control groups, armies were unable to prepare and maintain such a number of unimproved sections. Therefore at the end of August 1942 one or two military motor transport roads were assigned to armies, just as in the Battle of Moscow. Subsequently practical experience in road support of troops confirmed the correctness of this decision.

The maneuver character of defensive operations, a reduction in the complement and increase in the mobility of army rear services also brought changes in troop logistic support. First of all there was a trend toward reduction in stores of supplies kept at army supply depots. According to prewar views, army supply depots were to maintain up to two combat loads of ammunition, while in the Battle of Moscow at the end of 1941 army supply depots had on hand only 0.75 combat load. Similar stocks of ammunition were also typical for armies in defensive operations at Stalingrad, in the Battle for the Caucasus and at Kursk.

At the same time, in connection with change in the character of defensive operations, there was noted a trend toward stockpiling supplies taking into account their consumption not only in the defense but also with troops shifting to the attack. This was typical of the defensive operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, at Lake Balaton and elsewhere.

As the defense evolved and improved, and as the nation's economic capabilities grew, average daily consumption of supplies continued to increase. In the

operations at Moscow, for example, average daily ammunition expenditure in the armies ranged from 0.1-0.13 basic ammunition load for the principal calibers,[6] in the Battle of Kursk the 13th Army expended more than 3 basic loads of ammunition in eight days of defensive battle (from 5 through 12 July), which amounted to 0.4 basic loads per day. Relative expenditure of military stores increased, while fuel consumption decreased slightly in comparison with the first period of the war.

There was noted a trend toward an increase in the percentage share of motor transport in hauling supplies. The principal reasons for this were an increase in the quantity of motor transport in the armies, an increase in mobility of defense, and changes in army basing, road and logistic support.

In medical support services it was observed that medical facilities of the higher rear services echelon were moving closer to the combat troops and that a greater volume of medical assistance was being provided for the wounded than specified for a given stage of medical evacuation. In the defensive operations at Moscow in October-November 1941, for example, the main efforts of army medical establishments (hospital bases) were concentrated on giving emergency medical assistance to wounded and evacuating them to Soviet combat-zone and rear-area hospitals.

At Stalingrad army hospitals were moved up into the division areas of responsibility in the course of defense and operated in close coordination with their medical battalions. In the 64th, 57th, and 51st armies, for example, three mobile field hospitals were moved over to the west bank of the Volga and deployed in each army in order to reinforce the division medical battalions. Such a situation was also typical of defensive operations at Kursk, Lake Balaton, and in other areas.

* * *

Thus there was taking place in defensive operations during the Great Patriotic War a continuous process of improvement of army rear services -- the complement was reduced, control improved, rear services units and establishments acquired greater mobility, and working efficiency improved at all echelons.

The depth of army rear areas decreased. Army rear services transitioned from basing to separate railway sections and organization of regulating stations in these sections to basing to supply and railhead stations. One or two military motor transport roads began to be organized in the armies in place of unimproved sections.

Army rear services units and establishments were deployed closer and closer to the combat troops. Some were even positioned in the combat formations. As a result each element of the defense was becoming increasingly self-contained as regards rear services. Field army bases began regularly designating forward army supply depots. They were being positioned closer and closer to the combat troops and set up on unimproved sites.

Army rear services frequently performed their functions at the tactical echelon. Reduction of intermediate components in the supply scheme and performance of medical-evacuation activities made it possible to achieve greater efficiency in rear services support of troop combat actions.

Decrease in standard amounts of supplies maintained at army supply depots significantly increased the mobility of rear services units. Change in the manner and procedure of hauling supplies -- establishment of responsibility of higher-echelon control agencies for moving supplies to subordinate combined units -- promoted more efficient rear services operations.

The practical operating experience of army rear services in the defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War has retained its significance up to the present day. Study of this experience will help officers correctly understand ways to achieve further improvement in the performance of rear services units and establishments in present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. In modern rear services theory this term has been supplanted by the term "postroyeniye tyla" [rear services layout].

2. "Ustav tyla Krasnoy Armii" [Regulations of Red Army Rear Services], Part II, "Army Rear Services. Draft Regulations," Voyenizdat, 1941.

3. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 208, List 224922, File 1, sheets 197-200, 215, 218, 219.

4. Ibid., sheets 158-159.

5. Ibid., sheets 197-200, 215, 218, 219.

6. Ibid., Fund 208, List 281170, File 1, sheets 45-46.

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AGGRESSIVE PLANS AGAINST THE USSR IN 1939-1941

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[Article, published under the heading "Against the Bourgeois Falsifiers of History," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col A. Yakushevskiy: "The Aggressive Plans and Operations of Western Powers Against the USSR in 1939-1941"]

[Text] More than four decades have passed since the outbreak of World War II. It was engendered by the predatory policies of the most aggressive imperialist powers, which were seeking a redivision of the world. The opposing imperialist groupings also wanted to destroy the Soviet Union -- the world's first socialist state -- at all costs. Precisely this objective formed the basis of the Munich agreement between the reactionary British and French governments with Hitler and Mussolini in 1938, when fascist Germany was given a free hand in the East.

The signing of a treaty of nonaggression with Germany by the Soviet Government in August 1939, which thwarted the schemes of world imperialism to establish a unified military front against the USSR, evoked a new wave of anti-Sovietism in the West. On the instructions of the British and French governments, their war ministries and general staffs proceeded hastily preparing plans for an attack on the USSR and undertook concrete steps to implement these plans. We should note that this was done in conditions where the so-called "phony war" between Germany and an Anglo-French coalition was taking place in Western Europe. The intentions of the Western powers at this time was to "transform the war against Germany into a war against the USSR in alliance with German fascism."[1] Aggressive actions by the "Munichers" toward this end were strongly supported by U.S. ruling circles, who did not conceal their hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union. "American imperialism is presently playing a leading role in organization of a new anti-Soviet military front," noted the National Committee of the U.S. Communist Party at that time. "Contrary to the direct interests of the American people it is seeking, with the aid of stepped-up anti-Soviet activities, to thwart the peace policy of the Soviet Union, the aim of which is to prevent expansion of the imperialist war and to bring this war to an end."[2]

Information has been published in the past in Soviet historical literature on planning of aggression on the USSR by British and French ruling circles.[3] However, following declassification in the 1970's in England and a number of other countries of certain archival materials dealing with 1939-1941, it became possible to obtain

fuller information on the preparations by the Western powers to attack the Soviet Union in the conditions of a World War II which was already in progress.

The importance of exposing the aggressive anti-Soviet plans and actions on the part of the Western powers is dictated by the fact that in discussing the first period of World War II current reactionary bourgeois historiography attempts to level unsubstantiated accusations against the Soviet Union of conducting an "expansionist policy" in 1939-1941 and of "aggressive intentions" toward its neighbors, including the countries of the Near and Middle East. Accusations of this kind have lately begun to be repeated with particular frequency in connection with the events in Afghanistan and Soviet military assistance to that country at the request of the Afghan Government.

The U.S. newspaper NEW YORK TIMES, for example, has dredged up the old phony claim that the government of the USSR sought to extend its influence to "territory south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."[4] The U.S. military theory journal MILITARY REVIEW, basing its presentation on grossly distorted facts from the history of Soviet-Finnish relations during World War II, drew the provocational conclusion that "any weak neighbor of the Soviet Union can become the victim of aggression by the USSR."[5] The purpose of these slanderous imperialist fabrications is to sow seeds of distrust of the USSR among the peoples of the world and to conceal their own aggressive intrigues behind a screen of anti-Soviet fabrications.

New materials and documents dealing with preparations by the Western powers for war against the USSR in 1939-1941 convincingly refute the malicious calumny leveled by bourgeois falsifiers of history, who are attempting to rewrite history and ascribe "aggressive intentions" to the Soviet Union. Documents attest precisely to the opposite: "Aggressive aspirations" were characteristic not of the USSR but rather of the Western powers which, hiding behind the bugbear of a "Soviet threat," were working together with the nations of the fascist bloc during that period, drawing up plans for the destruction of the Soviet state.

One of the first plans of military operations against the Soviet Union was proposed to the British Government on 9 September 1939 by W. Churchill -- on the fourth day after he assumed the post of British naval minister. This plan was code-named "Catherine" (after Catherine the Great) and called for an attack on the USSR from the Baltic Sea. A principal role in this plan was assigned to naval forces, which would proceed to the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and, with air support, would initiate blockade actions there.[6]

The plan for war against the USSR proposed by Churchill totally refutes the claims made in bourgeois historiography that anti-Soviet military schemes on the part of the Western powers were born allegedly as a result of "Soviet aggression in Finland." Operation "Catherine" was approved by the British Government and began to be drawn up long before the commencement of the Finno-Soviet War.

The nucleus of the British military expedition to the Baltic Sea, according to W. Churchill's plan, was to consist of obsolete battleships of the R class, which were on a reserve status. The British Admiralty believed, however, that it would take at least a year to ready these ships for combat employment. Considerable time was

also needed to ready the requisite number of combat support ships for the operation. This threatened serious delays, while the British Government was in a hurry to go to war against the Soviet Union. Therefore by the end of 1939 the British and French military staffs were preparing two new variant plans of attack on the USSR: a "northern" and a "southern" version, execution of which, according to the calculations of the military-political leaders of the Western powers, required less time than an expedition into the Baltic. This is why the British Government rejected Operation "Catherine" in the middle of January 1940 and stepped up preparations for joint, with France, military operations against the USSR on the basis of the new plans.

The "northern" variant called for an attack on the USSR across Scandinavia. The Soviet-Finnish War, which began on 30 November 1939, was to be used as a pretext for the attack. It is indicative that as early as 6 December 1939 Britain's deputy foreign secretary R. Butler stated to ministry colleague A. Cadogan: "I very much fear that we shall go to war with Russia. I do not want this, but we must not lose our moral virtue."[7] For British ruling cirles war against the Soviet Union was a greater "moral virtue" than preserving peace.

Britain and France believed that the most convenient mode of attack on the USSR would be to land troops in Northern Norway and from there to transport them by rail across Northern Sweden to the Finnish-Soviet border. But the governments of these two Scandinavian countries adhered to a neutral position and were opposed to participation in an anti-Soviet war. Britain and France proceeded to exert strong pressure on them, attempting to frighten them with the imaginary threat of "Soviet aggression." This did not help. British and French military-political leaders thereupon proceeded to look for modes of attack on the USSR which did not involve the position taken by Norway and Sweden.

At the proposal of the French military command, subsequently approved by Britain's committee of chiefs of staff, it was decided to land Allied troops in Petsamo Bay (90 km west of Murmansk) and simultaneously to launch an attack with the objective of seizing the Norwegian port of Narvik, without waiting for permission from the governments of Norway and Sweden. French colonel (Ganval') was dispatched to Finland on 20 December 1939 to coordinate this plan with Finland's military leaders.[8]

British and French staffs proceeded to draw up a plan of the proposed operation, which was submitted on 15 January 1940 by General Gamelin, commander in chief of the French Army, to French Prime Minister Daladier. Talks between British and French military representatives were held on 31 January and 1 February 1940, at which measures pertaining to an attack on the USSR from the north were coordinated. On 5 February, at a meeting in Paris at the Allied Supreme Military Council, plans were approved for training and preparing two British divisions and almost an equal number of French troops to launch an aggressive action against the Soviet Union. In order to deceive the public, these troops were officially called "volunteers," allegedly intended to "assist Finland." It was decided to complete training and preparation of the designated contingents by the beginning of March and to transport them to the Scandinavian coast. The only differences of opinion which arose involved the point at which the force should be landed. The British pointed to difficulties of executing a landing in the Petsamo area, since it was in the hands of Soviet troops, and were more inclined to put the troops ashore in the Narvik area

and to move on from there to the Soviet border. No final decision was reached at this meeting regarding the landing site.[9]

On 20 February representatives of the Allied command -- British general (Ling) and French colonel (Ganval') -- arrived in Helsinki and briefed General Mannerheim, commander in chief of the Finnish Army, on the plans to land Anglo-French troops in the north, approved by the Allied Supreme Military Council. The objective was to "coordinate" matters pertaining to involving these troops in the war against the USSR as "assistance" to Finland. It was determined in the course of these talks, however, that Britain and France were concerned primarily with their own interests and cared little about the fate of Finland, the territory of which they were interested in utilizing only as a springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union. Even Finnish reactionaries realized, especially after the Soviet Army had successfully penetrated the "Mannerheim line," that only peace with their great neighbor could ensure the country's independence and its continuation as a sovereign nation. At a meeting of Finland's Council of Ministers on 28 February, the decision was made to initiate peace talks with the USSR in conformity with the proposal of the Soviet Government.

Learning of the impending peace talks between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Western powers proceeded to make every effort to block this course of events. They sought to keep the Soviet-Finnish war going, since this favored their anti-Soviet schemes to the greatest degree. W. Tanner, who was Finland's minister of foreign affairs at that time, stated the following in this connection: "The cabinet had scarcely made its decision when outside pressure began to be applied. France and England, whose assistance to us had been rather sporadic in the past, were now attempting, after learning of the latest cabinet decision, to impede with all means at their disposal the peace talks between Finland and the Soviet Union."[10]

With the aim of thwarting a Soviet-Finnish settlement, at the beginning of March French Prime Minister Daladier declared France's readiness and willingness immediately to give Finland 100 warplanes and to dispatch 50,000 French soldiers to Finland. At the same time Britain and France had issued an ultimatum to Sweden and Norway, demanding that Anglo-French troops be allowed to pass through their territory. When the Swedish king flatly rejected this ultimatum on 11 March, Churchill hastily traveled to Paris and met that same day, accompanied by Daladier, with the Finnish ambassador to France, H. Holm, who was given a briefing on the British and French plan of action in connection with dispatching Allied troops to Finland:

"After landing the troops, which will be trained and prepared in advance, the transport ships will immediately leave the Norwegian ports;

Norway and Sweden will only be informed of the landing of troops and the seizure of means of transportation essential for moving them;

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union will be broken immediately."[11]

Great Britain and France made it crystal clear to the government of Finland that, in spite of the negative position taken by Sweden and Norway, they were prepared to land troops very soon and to go to war against the USSR. "These proposals," writes West German scholar H. J. Lorbeer, "made on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, could have only one purpose -- to torpedo the Finnish-Soviet talks at all costs."[12]

The government of Finland refused to go along with these bitter enemies of the Soviet Union. It chose a more reasonable course. A peace treaty between the USSR and Finland was signed in Moscow on 12 March 1940.

The signing of this peace treaty thwarted the plans of the ruling circles of the Western powers to land troops in the northern part of Scandinavia to go to war against the USSR. They continued entertaining the possibility of opening up an anti-Soviet front in this region, however, especially after an attack had been launched against the Soviet Union from the south and the latter would be in a state of war with an Anglo-French coalition.

While the initiative came primarily from the British in the plans to attack the USSR from the north, France's ruling circles initially showed the greatest interest in the "southern" attack variant. Beginning in the summer of 1939, they were exceptionally active in the Balkans, attempting to put together an anti-Soviet coalition in that region and to draw into war against the USSR not only the Balkan countries and Turkey, but also the Near and Middle Eastern territories under French and British mandate (Syria, Iraq and other countries). In the Levant,[13] the formation of a French Army led by General Weygand was in the final completion stage in the summer of 1939. One of the principal missions of this army was seizure of the Dardanelles, in order to close off to the Soviet Union egress from the Black Sea, followed by establishment of a land front directed against the USSR. According to the plans of the French military leaders, the Balkan countries and Turkey were to supply 110 divisions, the principal arms for which were to be furnished by France and Great Britain.[14] France's ruling circles bound their hopes of bringing the war against Germany to an end at the expense of the USSR, with the establishment of an anti-Soviet coalition in the Balkans. French senator (Zh. Bardu), one of Daladier's closest friends, made the following diary entry on 23 December 1939: "We shall form a mighty bloc together with the neutrals and Italy. There is a possibility of offering Hitler the Crimea and bringing over to our side the Ukrainians, the population of Transcaucasia and the Persians. We can capture everything right up to the Caucasus."[15]

On 19 January 1940 Daladier, as head of the French Government, gave instructions to General Gamelin and Admiral Darlan, commander in chief of the French Navy, "to draft a brief memorandum on possible intervention to destroy the Russian oilfields." They were also instructed, alongside "direct intervention through to the Caucasus," to study the possibility of "encouraging a rebellion by the Islamic population of the Caucasus." Various anti-Soviet emigré organizations, the majority of which were headquartered in Paris, were enlisted for the task of engaging in subversive activities among the population of Transcaucasia.[16]

On 31 January General Gamelin met with top British military leaders and informed them of the task he had been assigned by the prime minister to make preparations for an attack on the Soviet oilfields. On 7 February this problem was discussed at a meeting of the British War Cabinet, which reached the conclusion that successful execution of anti-Soviet military operations "could substantially paralyze the Soviet economy, including agriculture." The committee of chiefs of staff were instructed to prepare an appropriate document in light of the new tasks.[17]

On 22 February 1940 Gamelin submitted to the French Government a memorandum prepared on Daladier's instructions, containing a plan of attack on the USSR from the Caucasus. Historians do not have the full text of this plan. It is known, however, that it called for launching an air attack primarily on the Baku and Batumi areas, destroying oil production and refining enterprises located there, as well as other industrial installations. Nor did the plan rule out the participation of ground forces in military operations in the Caucasus, but it stressed that the poorly developed road network would hamper their advance and offensive actions.[18]

In connection with the Soviet-Finnish peace talks which were in progress, the British began to take more active part in preparation for war against the USSR according to the "southern" variant. On 8 March the British chiefs of staff committee presented to the government a report entitled "Military Aspects of an Armed Clash With Russia in 1940." In comparison with Gamelin's presentation, which clearly specified the area of attack on the USSR (the southern border) and proposed specific forms for such an attack, the British document was more general in nature and indicated the possibility of military operations against the USSR not only from the south but also from the north and the Far East. The report stated that the Petsamo, Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk areas might be "the most suitable targets" for attack by Allied air and naval forces. In the Far East the report specified actions by submarines and other naval forces, with the objective of blockading Soviet ports. Presented in the greatest detail in this report were "methods with the aid of which the Allies can attack Russia" from the Near and Middle East. This attack, the report stated, could be launched "first of all, with an attack from the air, and secondly with actions by naval forces in the Black Sea and, finally, by operations by Turkish ground forces from Eastern Anatolia."[19] The document stressed the importance of reaching appropriate agreements with Turkey and Iran and of involving them in the war against the USSR.

The report listed among the most vulnerable Soviet targets the oil refineries in the Baku, Groznyy, and Batumi areas. "The plan of attack on these installations," the report noted, "is presently being drawn up by Air Force Headquarters in the Middle East, and is being examined at the Air Ministry. According to present estimates, destruction of the principal oil refineries can be achieved within a period of several weeks by continuous operations by forces of not less than three bomber squadrons.... Three squadrons of Blenheim Mk-IV aircraft can be furnished from the forces stationed in England and, if all preparatory operations are carried out immediately, they can be ready by the end of April to operate from bases in Northern Iraq or Syria." The report stated that for operations on the Black Sea "Allied naval forces will require battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and possibly an aircraft carrier," as well as various smaller support vessels. "Naval forces in the Black Sea," the report went on, "could cut off the Russians' oil supply by blockading the seaports of Batumi and Tuapse.... Carrier missions into the Black Sea for the purpose of bombing oil refineries, fuel storage and port facilities in Batumi and Tuapse will supplement to a considerable degree the principal airstrikes into the Caucasus."[20]

The end of the report contained a conclusion specifying why the Allies should concentrate their main efforts on attacking the Soviet Union from the south: "Since there are only a few important Russian installations in the Scandinavian region, the chiefs of staff committee recommends an attack on the southern regions of the

USSR. The Soviet Union's most vulnerable points can be hit in these regions. At the initial stage such an intervention should be limited to airstrikes."[21]

From 9 through 13 March British and French military representatives were holding talks in Ankara with officers of the Turkish General Staff, attempting to convince them of the necessity of Turkish participation in an anti-Soviet war. On 10 March the commander in chief of British forces in the Near and Middle East, General Wavell, informed General Weygand that instructions had been received from the British War Ministry in London "to study preliminary conditions of the possible operations against the Caucasus in case of war against Russia."[22] These meetings of Allied military high officials signaled the beginning of a period of active cooperation of French and British military staffs in the Near and Middle East for preparing for an attack on the USSR from the south.

On 12 March a report entitled "Military Aspects of an Armed Clash With Russia in 1940," prepared by Britain's Chiefs of Staff Committee, was discussed at a meeting of Britain's War Cabinet. Arguing in favor of the points presented in the report, Chief Air Marshal Newall, air force chief of staff, stressed: "An attack on the Caucasian oilfields is the most effective method by which we can deal a blow against Russia." He expressed the hope that the oilfields would be brought to a total standstill within one and a half to three months. Newall informed the war cabinet that modern long-range bombers had been sent to Egypt, which could be utilized to make up squadrons designated to fly airstrikes into the Caucasus.[23]

On 20 March high-level French and British air force officials met in the city of Aleppo, in the northwestern part of Syria, to coordinate concrete plans of air attack on the USSR. The French assumed responsibility for attacking targets along the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, and the British -- targets in the Baku and Groznyy areas. Soviet port facilities in the eastern part of the Black Sea were also be destroyed with the aid of air and naval forces.[24]

At the same time as they were coordinating plans of military operations against the USSR, British military leaders made the decision to conduct aerial reconnaissance of Soviet installations in the Caucasus. Organization of these operations was entrusted to the Intelligence Service, Britain's principal intelligence organization. In order to camouflage these intelligence operations, it was decided to employ a civilian twin-engine, long-range Lockheed-12A aircraft. High-resolution camera equipment was installed on board, and at the end of March the aircraft was transferred to the British air base at Habbaniya (in Iraq), approximately 80 kilometers west of Bagdad. Here its markings were changed to Soviet markings.

At dawn on 30 March the carefully prepared Lockheed-12A took off on its first mission (see diagram) [not reproduced], under the command of (Kh. Makfeyl), one of Britain's most experienced aerial reconnaissance experts, assisted by an officer-pilot and two aerial photography specialists from the British Royal Air Force. The aircraft crossed over the northwestern part of Iran, left the Caspian coast near the Iranian city of Resht and, after an hour's flight above the Caspian, emerged from the clouds in the vicinity of Baku, where the weather was clear and sunny. The aircraft flew six circles over the Apsheron Peninsula at an altitude of approximately 7,000 meters. Aerial photographs were taken not only with the stationary-mounted cameras but also with hand-held cameras fitted with telephoto lenses.

The aircraft returned to the base at Habbaniya toward evening, after a 10-hour flight.[25]

The Lockheed-12A flew a second reconnaissance mission six days later, on 5 April. This time its objective was the Caucasian Black Sea coast (the Poti-Batumi area). The aerial photographs obtained from these two missions were immediately dispatched by air to London. By 10 April they were in the hands of the British and French general staffs.[26]

On the basis of intelligence obtained from this aerial reconnaissance, missions of Allied air forces in military operations in the Caucasus were refined and detailed. A total of 122 Soviet targets were designated for destruction, chiefly oil refineries and fuel storage facilities. They included 67 in the Baku area, 43 at Groznyy, and 12 at Poti and Batumi. Nine bomber squadrons were to fly the strikes: 2 French squadrons of Farman 221s, 4 French squadrons of Glenn Martin bombers, and 3 British squadrons of Wellingtons (a total of 117 bombers). The French bombers were to fly out of a base south of Cizre (at the junction of the borders of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq), while the British bombers were to fly out of Mosul (Northern Iraq). From 10 to 45 days were allocated for accomplishing the mission, but the Anglo-French command was counting on destroying two thirds of the designated targets within the first six days of war against the Soviet Union. Western strategists had also calculated possible Allied aircraft losses during raids on the USSR. In the estimate of the British air force command, losses should not exceed 20 percent for the entire operation.[27]

Having completed all preparatory measures and calculations, the Allied command proceeded to wait for instructions from the British and French governments to commence military operations against the USSR.

Paul Reynaud, who succeeded Daladier as France's prime minister on 20 March 1940, continued vigorously supporting the idea of a war against the Soviet Union. In a letter to London dated 23 March, he urged more vigorous implementation of the designated war plans, stated that he was ready and willing to break diplomatic relations with Moscow, and even reproached the British Government for insufficient resolve.[28]

The French reproach was obviously evoked by the fact that not all members of the British Government were convinced of the success of the plotted anti-Soviet venture, while some entertained doubts about the advisability of war against the Russians. This was reflected at the 19 and 27 March meetings of the war cabinet. Foreign Minister Halifax noted in particular that the allocated forces would perhaps be insufficient to "inflict serious damage" on the Soviet Union and expressed the supposition that in order to achieve success Britain would "sooner or later be compelled to send expeditionary forces to the Black Sea." It was also suggested as a possible supplement to the already elaborated plans, to send French and British submarines to the Black Sea to operate against Soviet ships.[29]

On 28 March the Allied Supreme War Council examined in detail two aspects of the planned attack on the USSR. Reynaud expressed the opinion that "destruction of the Baku oilfields is a sure, decisive and simple operation." He voiced his willingness to ignore any objections which might come from Turkey in connection with the fact that

that country would not be informed by the Allies in advance about their sneak attack on the Soviet Caucasian oilfields.[30]

Even after German-fascist troops launched Operation Weseruebung on 9 April 1940, with the objective of seizing Denmark and Norway, Britain and France continued preparations to attack the USSR. On 15 April Reynaud asked the British ambassador in Paris to pass on to London the request that the "Caucasus operation be accelerated." As a pretext for going to war, he suggested accusing the Soviet Union of "hostile actions" against the Allies, including reports about the "possibility of a Soviet invasion of Norway," which were fabricated by the bourgeois press at that time. In connection with Reynaud's request, the British War Cabinet decided at its meeting that same day "to place those forces and assets already available in the Middle East in the highest possible degree of readiness."[31]

On 17 April Weygand reported from Syria to Paris, to Gamelin and General (Vyuil'men), commander in chief of the French Air Force, that "preparations for bombing the Caucasian oilfields have advanced so far that the operation can be commenced in the immediate future." The French Government took Weygand's report under advisement and made the decision "to attack the USSR at the end of June or beginning of July 1940."[32]

On 23 April the matter of "military operations in the Caucasus" was given priority treatment at a meeting of the Allied Supreme Military Council. Reporting to the members of Britain's War Cabinet on the results of the discussion, Chamberlain stated that the operation in the Caucasus "can be undertaken in the immediate future." "At the present moment," he said, "we do not need to spare bombers of those types which can operate against the Russian oilfields from the territory of our allies, since shorter-range bombers can operate only from Turkish soil."[33]

The defeat of the Anglo-French forces in Norway, and subsequently in Western Europe, prevented the military-political leaders of the Western powers from launching the attack on the Soviet Union, which was planned for June-July 1940. Finding themselves in a critical situation following the defeat and surrender of France, the British leaders were forced to abandon plans for an anti-Soviet war. They recalled these plans once again, however, in the winter of 1940/41. British ruling circles were seeking to exert political pressure on the USSR with a threat of attack. On 31 January 1941 Churchill, who had become British prime minister (May 1940), sent Turkish President (Inyen) a message which stated, among other things: "Nothing will restrain Russia to such an extent from assisting Germany, even indirect assistance, as the presence of large British bomber forces which could attack the Baku oilfields."[34]

These are the historical facts. They irrefutably attest that it was not the Soviet Union which was scheming in 1939-1941 about "expansion" "south from Batumi and Baku," as imperialist propaganda today claims, but rather the Western powers which were hatching anti-Soviet conspiracies and drafting plans of military intervention against the USSR in 1939-1941, making preparations to launch joint strikes against major Soviet economic installations. All these "military preparations and blatantly hostile actions by Great Britain and France toward the USSR did enormous detriment to the Western countries.... They diverted the attention of London and Paris away from the principal danger -- the imminent massive strike by the

Wehrmacht in the West, and they weakened the Allies' defense."[35] The shortsighted antinational policy of the British and French Governments, which was dictated by the narrow class interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie, cost the peoples of these countries dearly, as well as the other European peoples.

The reactionary ruling circles of the imperialist powers, headed by the United States, blinded by class hatred toward the world socialist system and the national liberation movement, are attempting today as well to establish in the world an order to their liking, using any and all means, including armed force. "Adventurism, willingness to stake the vital interests of mankind for the sake of their own narrow, selfish aims -- this is particularly glaringly manifested in the policies of the most aggressive imperialist circles," stressed the 26th CPSU Congress.[36]

Whenever the imperialists must justify their aggressive schemes and actions against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist community, they spread a deliberate lie about the "Soviet military threat," and they resort to falsification of history to bolster this lie. Aggressive circles of imperialism are attempting at the present time, under the banner of unsubstantiated statements about a "Soviet military threat," to bury détente and to provoke an even more dangerous round of the arms race. The military establishment of the aggressive NATO bloc is advancing militarist doctrines which are dangerous to the cause of peace. They seek to convince people that a nuclear war can be limited. Bourgeois propaganda aims at getting the public in the capitalist countries to accept the idea that such a war is admissible and that victory over the Soviet Union could be achieved in such a war. One such scenario was described in a book entitled "The Third World War -- August 1985," by retired British general John Hackett, former commander of NATO's Northern Army Group.[37]

But the NATO generals should remember the lessons of history, which serve as a stern warning to the aggressive forces of present-day imperialism. "The history of the new society which was begun by the October Revolution," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "irrefutably attests to the fact that he who has encroached upon socialism has been crushed. Nor can there be any other fate for those who would encroach upon the achievements of socialism."[38]

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR" [History of USSR Foreign Policy], A. A. Gromyko and P. P. Ponomarev, editors, Vol 1, Moscow, Nauka, 1976, page 408.

2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 3, Voyenizdat, 1974, page 47.

3. See "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1963, pp 273-275; "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 3, pp 43-48; "Istoriya diplomatii" [History of Diplomacy], Vol 5, Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, pp 32-37; "Istoriya vneshney...," op. cit., Vol 1, pp 408-409; O. A. Rzheshevskiy, "Policy of Encouraging Fascist Aggression Against the USSR (Some Military Aspects)" in the volume "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna i sovremennost'" [World War II and the Present Day], Voyenizdat, 1972, pp 116-138.

4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 30 December 1979, Section E, page 1.

5. MILITARY REVIEW, September 1980, page 92.

6. Lorbeer, H. J., "Westmaechte gegen die Sowjetunion 1939-1941" [The Western Powers Against the Soviet Union, 1939-1941], Freiburg, 1975, pp 43-44.

7. A. Cadogan, "The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945," London, 1976, page 235.

8. Lorbeer, op. cit., pp 53-54.

9. B. H. Liddell Hart, "History of the Second World War," London, 1978, pp 59-60.

10. Quoted in: G. Kahle, "Das Kaukasusprojekt der Alliierten vom Jahre 1940" [The Allied Caucasus Project of 1940], Opladen, 1973, page 13.

11. W. Hubatsch, "'Weseruebung': Die deutsche Besetzung von Daenemark und Norwegen 1940" [Operation "Weseruebung": The German Occupation of Denmark and Norway, 1940], Goettingen, 1960, page 25.

12. Lorbeer, op. cit, page 58.

13. Levant (literally -- east) -- obsolete French designation for the countries situated on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean (primarily the former French mandate territories of Syria and Lebanon).

14. Lorbeer, op. cit., pp 62-63.

15. A. Horne, "Ueber die Maas, ueber Schelde und Rhein" [Across the Maas, the Schelde and the Rhine], Vienna, 1969, page 121.

16. Lorbeer, op. cit., pp 67-70.

17. Public Records Office (henceforth PRO), Cab 65/5, page 172.

18. Lorbeer, op. cit., page 71.

19. PRO, Cab 66/6, pp 100-104.

20. Ibid., pp 102-104.

21. Ibid., pp 99-100.

22. Lorbeer, op. cit., pp 76-78.

23. PRO, Cab 65/6, page 62.

24. L. M. Chassin, "A Grandiose Plan: The Attack on the Caucasian Oilfields in 1940," FORCES AERIENNES FRANCAISES, No 176, 1961, pp 836-840.

25. J. Piekalkiewicz, "Luftkrieg 1939-1945" [Air War, 1939-1945], Munich, page 65.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp 65-66.

28. Lorbeer, op. cit., page 80.

29. PRO, Cab 65/6, pp 97-98, 116-120.

30. Ibid., page 125.

31. Ibid., page 213.

32. Pielkalkiewicz, op. cit., page 66.

33. PRO, Cab 65/6, pp 249, 260.

34. I. Playfair, "The Mediterranean and the Middle East," London, 1954, Vol 1, page 467.

35. "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 3, page 48.

36. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 20.

37. J. Hackett, "The Third World War -- August 1985," London, 1978.

38. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. Rechi i stat'i" [Following a Leninist Course. Speeches and Articles], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, page 40.

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ADMIRAL GORSHKOV ON PACIFIC NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 58-65

[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Commander in Chief of the Navy - Deputy USSR Minister of Defense HSU Flt Adm SU S. Gorshkov: "Strategic Operations in the Pacific Theater of Military Operations in World War II (Based on the experience of the Japanese armed forces)]

[Text] One of the specific features of World War II, in spite of the fact that its principal missions were accomplished on land fronts, was the exceptionally large scale of combat operations on the seas, and in particular in the Pacific Theater.

The large scale of combat operations in the Pacific was promoted by the fact that the belligerent nations -- Japan, the United States and its allies -- were sea powers. They were separated by an ocean and possessed vast island territories, and the efforts of the armed forces of Japan and the United States in the Pacific Theater essentially boiled down to fighting for these island possessions.

The relative strengths in the Pacific at the outbreak of the war were as follows. The Allies -- the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands -- were superior to Japan in ground forces by 50 percent. Their combat capabilities were substantially diminished, however, due to the fact that these forces were scattered over vast areas, as well as poor coordination between army, air and naval forces. The adversaries were approximately equal in strength as regards number of warships (except for carriers). The Japanese fleet was three times the size of the Allied fleet in carriers and number of embarked aircraft. Thus the Japanese possessed favorable conditions for conducting aggressive combat operations.

The Japanese command was counting particularly heavily on its strategic mobile forces. They included large ground troop formations, air and naval forces. Aircraft carriers constituted an effective weapon of the naval forces. The 10 carriers in service with the Japanese fleet at the beginning of the war carried 575 aircraft on board. The level of aircrew proficiency was fairly high. Japanese command authorties were also counting to a certain extent on shore-based naval aviation.

The Japanese were planning to conduct principal military actions on coastal, ocean and sea axes. Sea supremacy was considered to be a reliable guarantee of the success of such operations, supremacy which was to be achieved by destroying or

seriously weakening the adversary's navy prior to an official declaration of war. These plans were to be accomplished by mounting strategic offensive operations during the initial months of war, as well as several smaller-scale operations aimed at seizing the major islands of the Dutch East Indies -- Java and Sumatra; gaining supremacy in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean; seizing Burma and important territories in the Southwest Pacific. The validity of these plans was tested in map war games and exercises with the participation of ground forces, air and naval forces command authorities and staffs.

Principal attention was devoted to training assault landing troops to operate in tropical climate conditions. A special field manual was issued to the armed forces taking into account the experience of exercises conducted on this topic. Items worked on in the course of exercises included organization of defense of landing forces en route to the objective area, putting troops ashore in shallow-water conditions, tactics of swift capture of enemy airfields and their preparation for utilization by friendly aircraft, etc. Fleets practiced independent actions involving destroying enemy warships in base and at sea primarily with carrier-based aviation. One can conclude from the above that Japanese military leaders were preparing their armed forces for the conduct of operations with the element of surprise, with decisive objectives.

Among the many operations and battles fought in the Pacific Theater we shall draw the readers' attention only to strategic operations at the first stage of the war. There were three such operations: the Hawaiian (7 December 1941), the Malayan (7 December 1941-15 February 1942), and the Philippine Operation (8 December 1941-2 January 1942).[1]

The above-listed operations are closely interlinked by the overall Japanese military strategy of that time. Their plans reflected the hegemonist aims of Japanese militarism.

The Japanese Navy's Hawaiian Operation to destroy U.S. warships at Pearl Harbor was the first strategic operation in the Pacific Theater. Its objective was to knock out of action the core of the U.S. Navy, to gain supremacy in the Pacific, and to support the Japanese advance on the main strategic axis in the South Pacific.

Preparations for this operation took about a year. The overall scheme and its plan of execution were elaborated in great detail. Detailed and comprehensive knowledge of the situation in the theater and in the Hawaiian Islands area, as well as the defense system of the principal U.S. naval base in the Pacific enabled the Japanese command authorities comprehensively to plan the operation and to train and prepare forces for its execution.

The plan called for secretly deploying fleet forces in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor prior to declaration of war and, exploiting weak points in the adversary's defense, to launch a sneak attack by carrier-based aircraft and destroy U.S. warships standing in base and aircraft on the ground at airfields on the island of Oahu and in the air around the base. Any warships which succeeded in putting out to sea were to be destroyed by submarines.

The following were employed in the operation: a large naval task force, containing six heavy carriers, which carried 353 aircraft, 16 surface units (battleships, cruisers, destroyers), and 30 submarines,[2] a large number of which were assigned the mission of penetrating the harbor on the night preceding the strike, in order to torpedo battleships. The remaining submarines were designated to exploit the successful main attack in case of departure of the U.S. fleet from base, as well as the mission of conducting reconnaissance.

Preparation and training of the carrier air groups began in August 1941 and included bringing them up to strength with the most highly trained aircrews from ships not taking part in the operations, as well as practicing dropping torpedoes from low altitudes and close range in shallow waters, dive-bombing and releasing bombs from horizontal flight, delivering machinegun and cannon fire at sea and shore targets, plus other tasks. Practice of these missions was conducted in conditions maximally approximating actual combat, and with observance of special security measures. Considerable attention was devoted to weapons modernization, especially torpedoes, and their effective utilization in concrete situation conditions.

Within the system of operational support measures in the forthcoming operation, particular importance was attached to thorough mastery of all types of intelligence gathering, camouflage and concealment. Intelligence collection activities were conducted throughout the entire area of the forthcoming operation. Japanese agents in the Hawaiian Islands were extensively employed to obtain intelligence on the enemy, with their principal efforts concentrated on determining the composition of forces in base and organization of all types of base defense. Intelligence gathering missions were also assigned to merchant ships and fishing vessels. Immediately prior to the attack, submarines were deployed to maintain surveillance on approaches to the base.

Achievement of the element of surprise was ensured by surprise and deception. Documents were drawn up in conditions of the strictest secrecy, with involvement of a limited number of command and staff personnel. Deployment of the ships of the task force was accomplished in secrecy, from Hitokappu Bay on the island of Iturup to an area north of Pearl Harbor, keeping away from the principal sea-lanes and beyond the range of shore-based U.S. aircraft, maintaining radio silence. Normal radio traffic was maintained at the permanent basing locations, with employment of the radio call signs of those ships which had put to sea for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Scheduling the attack for Sunday also helped achieve the element of surprise. The adopted measures ensured secrecy in readying forces for the operation. Top U.S. command authorities, however, learned of the possibility of a Japanese attack one week prior to the strike on Pearl Harbor.

When the Japanese attacked, U.S. fleet forces at Pearl Harbor totaled 93 warships and vessels, including 8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 5 submarines, 9 minelayers and 10 minesweepers. There were no carriers in base.

Overall defense of the Hawaiian Islands was handled by the Army. Army and naval aviation comprised the backbone of the defense system. A total of 394 aircraft were based at six airfields on the island of Oahu. They were in a low state of readiness, however. Aircraft on the ground at airfields were neither dispersed nor sheltered in revetments. The island was defended by 294 antiaircraft guns of various caliber,

not including shipboard antiaircraft weapons. The base had five radar stations, operation of which, just as employment of antiaircraft weapons, proved ineffective. The garrison totaled 42,959 men.[3] There was no unified command for the defense of this principal U.S. naval base.

The Americans failed to consider the possibility and danger of a sneak attack. Therefore defense of the base was organized poorly and, in spite of the fact that intelligence reported the possibility of a Japanese attack, defenses were not reinforced.

On the day of the Japanese attack the entrance to the base was not blocked by harbor booms, torpedo nets were not being used to protect the ships, and there were no barrage balloons in the air. Naval patrols posted on the approaches to the base, as well as aerial reconnaissance were focused south and westward, which were considered to be the directions of greatest threat. Warships stood bunched at anchor and at the docks.

The first to swing into action were the midget submarines, which commenced penetration to the base on the night of 7 December 1941. Some were spotted and destroyed by the Americans or went down due to technical malfunctions prior to penetration.[4]

The main attack on the U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor was delivered by Japanese aircraft in two waves (353 aircraft). Each wave contained groups of aircraft to attack ships, enemy aircraft on the ground, and a fighter cover group.

Aircraft proceeded to take off from the Japanese carriers at 0600 on 7 December. Dive bombers of the first wave hit the airfield at approximately 0800 and destroyed most of the aircraft on the island of Oahu. Almost simultaneously torpedo planes and bombers attacked the battleships in base. During this time fighters were winning down the American airfields. An hour later the base was attacked by the second-wave aircraft, which hit those battleships and other warships which were still afloat. Results proved meager, however, while aircraft losses were greater than those of the first wave. This indicated that the Americans had recovered somewhat from the first attack and were bringing their air defense forces into a state of readiness.

Japanese aircraft destroyed or damaged all battleships, six light cruisers, a destroyer, and 272 aircraft. The Americans sustained 3,400 casualties, including 2,402 killed.[5] The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft and 6 submarines, 5 of which were midget subs.[6] The success of the operation was due in significant measure to meticulous planning and secrecy of preparation by the Japanese, as well as an amazing unconcern and unsatisfactory combat readiness of the forces defending the U.S. Navy's principal base.

Carrier-based aircraft carried out the principal mission in destroying U.S. naval forces, while all other forces performed support roles.

At the same time the Japanese command authorities made serious operational and tactical errors in this operation. The absence of a reliable reconnaissance effort, for example, on the approaches to the island of Oahu prevented the Japanese from spotting U.S. carriers, one of which, the "Enterprise," was located 210 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor, while a second, the "Lexington," was located 700 miles

away. In connection with this, the Japanese fleet unleashed the power of its weapons not on the U.S. Navy's main forces -- the aircraft carriers, but against battleships which, U.S. flag officers acknowledged, were "too weak to engage the newest Japanese battleships or to escort the new fast U.S. aircraft carriers."[7]

The Japanese failed to utilize the possibility of a repeat attack on Pearl Harbor, where large stores of weapons, fuel (400,000 tons of residual fuel oil) and other supplies were stockpiled. It would have taken a long time to replace the loss of these supplies and would have substantially limited utilization of the base by U.S. naval forces.

Inflicting enormous damage on the U.S. Navy, the Japanese gained temporary superiority in the Pacific and were able to conduct offensive operations in the South Pacific without fear of serious enemy opposition.

The operation against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor was launched approximately 1 year after the British operation to destroy the nucleus of the Italian surface fleet at Taranto. These operations are an example of actions aimed at destroying the enemy's naval forces in base, with the objective of gaining supremacy in a sea theater. Skillful exploitation of the situation is characteristic of both operations: decisive and highly dynamic actions resulting in the success of the attacking force, substantial losses inflicted on the attacked forces, and little damage to the attacking force; detailed planning and careful concealment of one's actions, and deception of the enemy.

The Hawaiian operation was linked to a number of subsequent large-scale Japanese military operations. Those immediately following Pearl Harbor included the Malayan and the Philippine operations. In the course of these operations the Japanese took full advantage of the abrupt change in the balance of naval power in their favor and the overall strategic situation in the Pacific Theater.

The Malayan strategic operation aimed at seizing British Malaya's wealth of strategic raw materials, as well as the principal base of the British fleet, Singapore. Its strategic character was determined not so much by the composition of the forces involved as by the significance of the targets. If successful, the Japanese would be presented with the opportunity to seize a highly advantageous, key position, which would ensure favorable conditions for a subsequent offensive drive southward toward Indonesia and Australia, as well as westward toward the Indian Ocean.

British Malaya was defended by approximately 100,000 British troops. They were supported by the Eastern Fleet, consisting of a battleship, a cruiser, and four destroyers. The British had a division of Dutch submarines at their disposal. A total of 332 aircraft were deployed at 34 airfields in Malaya and Singapore. In the course of the operation the British force was reinforced with 45,000 men and 141 aircraft. The fortress at Singapore boasted artillery up to 406 mm, five airfields, and large stores of military equipment, ammunition and food stores. The British lacked, however, the requisite antiamphibious defense system and realistic plans for defense of the coast, shore installations, and Singapore proper. British ground troops, air and naval forces were operationally separate and isolated, with no coordination worked out among them. The very first days of the Japanese

invasion of Malaya demonstrated the overall unfitness of the men and the extremely poor professional level of the officers, general and flag officers of the British forces in this region.

The Japanese designated for seizure of Malaya the 25th Army, totaling approximately 70,000 men, the 3d Air Force, totaling 450 aircraft, 114 shore-based naval aircraft, as well as a naval task force consisting of 2 battleships, 8 cruisers, and 16 destroyers, 3 flotillas of submarines, 3 seaplane carrying vessels and a large number of auxiliary vessels. Aircraft carriers did not participate in this operation.

The plan of operation was to launch surprise strikes on the airfields in Northern Malaya, with the objective of neutralizing the enemy's air power and gaining air superiority. An amphibious assault force was to be landed in the northern part of Malaya simultaneously with an invasion of Thailand from the sea and by land from Indochina, after which, engaging in offensive exploitation along the east and west coast of Malaya, Singapore would be captured.

Training, preparation and deployment of forces were accomplished prior to initiation of hostilities. En route by sea to the objective area, the landing forces were provided protection by surface units, submarines and aircraft from airfields in Indochina. Landing of the assault force on the Malayan coast was accomplished without substantial enemy resistance. Limited capabilities in employment of aviation were a weak spot for the Japanese. Therefore the amphibious assault troops initially directed their main thrust toward seizing one of the largest British airfields in the northern part of Malaya. Following successful accomplishment of this mission, Japanese aircraft were redeployed to this field, subsequently providing support to the southward advance of the Japanese troops. On the first two days of the fighting, Japanese air power destroyed approximately 30 percent of the enemy's aircraft.

To repulse the Japanese amphibious landing, the British command dispatched the Eastern Squadron to the Gulf of Siam, this force consisting of a battleship, a battle cruiser, and 4 destroyers. Spotting these warships, on 10 December the Japanese attacked by air and sank the battleship "Prince of Wales" and the battle cruiser "Repulse." This weakened the defense of Malaya and Singapore to an even greater extent.

Exploiting their offensive advantage, Japanese troops, encountering no significant resistance, advanced along the western and eastern coasts of Malaya, from time to time landing small assault forces to the rear of the retreating British troops. The British were surrendering everywhere, and on 15 February 1942 they yielded the crown colony of Singapore without a fight.

In the course of this operation the Japanese routed a strong force of British troops in the Far East, seized advantageous strategic positions for continuing the advance into the Dutch East Indies, toward Burma and India, and gained access to the Indian Ocean. By destroying Britain's principal naval and air forces, the Japanese further strengthened their sea and air supremacy in the South China Sea and secured favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.

The Malayan operation demonstrated the total unpreparedness of British forces to conduct an antiamphibious defense. British command authorities were unable to concentrate the efforts of their military forces in the principal sector or to organize coordination among them. As a result, each of the armed services was crushed by the Japanese separately. The British lost 140,000 men. Japanese casualties totaled approximately 10,000 men killed and wounded.

Surrender of the main British naval base in the Far East, Singapore, was particularly humiliating. The British declined to defend their base, which had a large, well armed and equipped garrison.

The Philippine strategic operation aimed at defeating in detail the American-Filipino forces, seizing this U.S. colony, which was rich in raw materials, and creating favorable conditions for subsequent military operations against the Dutch East Indies and Australia. Airstrikes were to be flown against airfields and naval bases, gaining air and sea supremacy, and amphibious assault forces were to be landed on the island of Luzon with the mission of crushing the enemy's forces, capturing Manila, capital of the Philippines, with assault forces landed simultaneously in the southern part of the Philippine Islands to assist the main forces in capturing naval bases.

The Philippine Islands were defended by an American-Filipino army of approximately 130,000 men (including 31,000 Americans), with 270 aircraft, and the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, consisting of 3 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 29 submarines.

Participating in the operation on the Japanese side were the 14th Army and a special Philippine task force consisting of 10 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 2 seaplane tenders, and a large number of landing ships and auxiliary vessels. The Japanese allocated 496 aircraft, including 304 naval aircraft, to neutralize enemy aviation. Just as in the Malayan operation, no aircraft carriers took part in this operation.[8]

The operation commenced on 8 December with airstrikes against airfields in the Philippines. Half of the U.S. bombers and one third of U.S. fighters were destroyed in the very first attacks. U.S. command authorities, already knowing about the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor and aware of a concentration of Japanese aircraft on the island of Formosa, took no steps to boost the readiness of forces to repulse air attacks and to beef up the islands' air defenses.

While the operations against Pearl Harbor and Malaya began with surprise attacks, in the course of which the principal missions were accomplished, in the Philippine operation the main attack was preceded by two weeks of preliminary bombardment, the purpose of which was maximally to weaken the American forces defending the Philippines. At the same time the Japanese landed a few tactical assault forces to improve the initial position of the main invasion forces and for redeploying to captured airfields the fighter aircraft essential for supporting the landing of the main forces of the Japanese 14th Army. As a result, Japanese aviation gained air supremacy, and the tactical landing forces prepared conditions for landing the main forces. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet, stripped of air cover, did not take active part in the battle for the Philippines. Ground troops were given no naval or air support. The main thrust from the sea was launched in an area southwest of Manila.

In spite of the presence of a large contingent of U.S. ground troops in the Philippines, they were unable to organize an antilanding defense. The Japanese met practically no resistance when bringing the main forces ashore in any of the nine landing areas. On 2 January 1942, 10 days after the main forces landed, the Japanese took Manila, thus accomplishing the operation objective, although remnants of American and Filipino troops continued to hold some areas for approximately 4 months. Thus the decisive role of air and sea supremacy in such operations was confirmed once again.

The Japanese strategic operations in the Pacific Theater created the conditions for a subsequent expanded Japanese offensive against the Allied possessions in the region. Subsequently the Japanese comparatively easily smashed the Dutch fleet, reinforced by British and Australian warships and, taking advantage of their commanding position in the Philippine and South China seas, a position reinforced by successes in the two strategic operations conducted in this region, proceeded to advance southward "by bounds," as a rule equal to the combat radius of their aircraft. This method was later employed by the Americans in their counteroffensive in the Pacific.

The Japanese captured the Dutch East Indies, the islands of Guam, Wake, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, etc. Thus in six months time Japan succeeded in seizing, with the aid of its navy, territory totaling 3.8 million square kilometers with a population of 150 million. Great Britain and the United States were deprived of extremely important strategic areas. This ended the Japanese success.

It soon became evident that Japan was unable to hold and consolidate such vast territories. The adventurism of Japanese policy, expressed in unchecked seizures of more and more new territory, led to a scattering of forces and the impossibility of concentrating them on the main axes, and ultimately to loss of the territory Japan had seized.

The successful conduct of these Japanese operations was promoted by effective measures to ensure sea supremacy, the element of surprise and decisiveness on the part of the Japanese command authorities, as well as confusion and a poor degree of combat stability on the part of U.S. military forces and those of their allies in the Pacific. At first the U.S. Navy lost one battle after the other. But this continued until the first major victories by the Soviet Armed Forces in the war against Hitlerite hordes. The war effort of the Soviet Union, which was fighting fascist Germany practically alone, enabled the United States and Great Britain to rebuild their naval forces in the Pacific.

Of considerable importance in defeating the Japanese armed forces was the military-economic superiority of the United States, which mobilized its potential to replace its losses and to create the material conditions for conducting extensive offensive operations, in the course of which the Americans, utilizing the advantageous overall strategic situation of World War II, were able gradually to retake all the territories which had been seized by the Japanese in the South and Central Pacific, as well as to capture several Japanese islands.

The experience of the strategic operations of the Japanese armed forces in World War II is of considerable interest in connection with the fact that it is also being

taken into consideration today by the capitalist countries in the development of contemporary views on the conduct of military operations in ocean theaters. The significance of this experience becomes objectively greater with an increase in the capabilities of armed forces to conduct operations of a strategic scale. Preparation for such operations, aimed against the Soviet Union and the socialist nations, is confirmed by the entire experience of organizational development of the armed forces of the United States and its allies, including Japan, the foreign policy of which is characterized by going along with the dangerous plans of Washington and Beijing, while a trend toward militarization is increasing in Japan's domestic policy.[9]

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp 386-394.

2. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1978, page 295.

3. Ibid.

4. For more detail see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 1, 1981, pp 58, 59.

5. "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 4, page 388.

6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya...," op. cit., page 296.

7. Ch. Nimits and E. Potter, "Voyna na more (1939-1945)" [War on the Sea (1939-1945)], Voyenizdat, 1965, page 250.

8. "Istoriya vtoroy...," op. cit., Vol 4, page 389.

9. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 25.

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REVIEW OF COLLECTED DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO NATIONAL DEFENSE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 75-79

[Article by F. Petrov: "CPSU Concern for the Economic and Defense Might of Our Homeland and Preserving Peace"]

[Text] Volume 13 of the collection "The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums,"[1] which has recently been published, contains major party documents covering the period from January 1978 through June 1980. It reveals our party's enormous organizational and ideological activities pertaining to implementing the resolutions of the 25th CPSU Congress and strengthening our country's defense and economic might.

The decrees of the July, November (1978), April and November (1979) CPSU Central Committee plenums as well as other documents contained in this volume persuasively attest to the fact that the Communist Party is consistently and persistently implementing a Leninist course of domestic and foreign policy, which is securing the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people. Successful fulfillment of the 10th Five-Year Plan was being completed during the period covered by this volume. Plan fulfillment results confirmed the correctness of the socioeconomic strategy elaborated at the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, our country achieved enormous success in economic growth, in accomplishing large and important social tasks, and in increasing the economic and defense potential of the socialist homeland.

"In the period under review the party and government did not for a single day fail to address matters pertaining to strengthening this country's defense might and its Armed Forces," stated Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress. "We are obliged to do this by the international situation."[2]

The CPSU Central Committee decree of 15 March 1979 entitled "On the 50th Anniversary of the First Five-Year Plan of Development of the USSR Economy" notes that "A world-historic victory of the Soviet people -- building of a developed socialist society in the USSR, constituted the result of implementation of economic and social transformations...." (page 336). The decree instructed party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations as well as economic agencies to continue in the future directing organizational-political and ideological indoctrination work toward

further activation of the productive energy of working people to achieve powerful growth of our homeland's economic, scientific-technical and defense potential, as well as the cultural level and prosperity of Soviet citizens.

It follows from the documents in this volume that the central focus of all the productive activities of party and people also included such major, key problems as development of the power industry, the fuel and raw materials base, metallurgical industry, machine building, chemical industry, transportation, improvement of the state of affairs in capital construction, and increase in manufacture of consumer goods. The decisions of the November (1978 and 1979) CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the following party and government decrees: "On the Organizational and Political Work of the Donetskaya Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party on Ensuring Fulfillment of Construction Plans and Movement of Production Facilities On-Stream" (pp 217-221); "Report of the Central Committee of the Turkmenistan Communist Party on Work to Carry Out the Decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress" (pp 375-381); "On Measures to Achieve Further Improvement of Training and Boosting of Worker Skills in Production" (pp 384-390); "On Further Improvement of the Economic Mechanism and Tasks of Party and Government Agencies" (pp 405-407); and "On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Effect of the Economic Mechanism on Improving Production Efficiency and Work Quality" (pp 408-451) -- which are published in this volume, were directed toward accomplishing these tasks.

The party devoted close attention to further development of agriculture, stating as its goal a sharp rise in production of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials in the interests of improved living standards and bringing closer together living conditions in urban and rural areas. An important role in accomplishing these tasks was played by the decisions of the July (1978) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and by the following decrees: "On Measures to Increase in 1978-1985 Production of High-Output Equipment for Feed Production and Processing as Well as Total Mechanization of Jobs in Livestock Units and in Poultry Raising" (pp 107-114); "On Measures to Increase Feed Production and Improve Quality of Feeds in 1978-1985" (pp 135-141); "On Measures to Achieve Further Development of Total Mechanization of Agricultural Production and Furnishing Agriculture With High-Output Equipment" (pp 161-173); "On Measures to Achieve Further Development of Rice Growing" (pp 587-592); plus others. They specify an extensive program of development and improvement of efficiency in all branches of agricultural production, furnishing our farms with the requisite equipment, construction of new, expansion and renovation of existing enterprises which manufacture farm equipment. The program calls for expanding scientific research efforts in the area of feed crop plant breeding, development of highly efficient forage production methods, and adoption of systems of equipment for mechanizing and automating the basic production processes in feed production, plus many other items.

The documents and materials contained in Volume 13 show that the CPSU Central Committee, headed by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, devotes constant attention toward the economic development of all our country's regions. This is eloquently attested by the document entitled "On the Results of the Trip to Siberia and the Far East by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," adopted on 15 April 1978 by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council

of Ministers (pp 76-78). This document notes that during his trip L. I. Brezhnev met with and conversed at length with party-economic activists and members of CPSU oblast committee and kray committee bureaus in many cities in Siberia and the Far East, including Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and Komsomol'sk-na-Amure. He visited a number of industrial enterprises and construction projects and talked with workers, construction workers on the Baikal-Amur Mainline, and Soviet Army and Navy personnel. During these get-togethers and conversations Leonid Il'ich made important comments and recommendations on the future economic development of the eastern regions and on improving working and living conditions for the people in these areas. The document states that the task presently consists in continuing to increase production of coal, crude oil, and natural gas, particularly Tyumen', in the eastern part of our country, and more fully utilize the hydroelectric power resources of these regions for growth and development of the aluminum, pulp and paper, petrochemical and other industries.

Growth in our homeland's economic potential is accompanied by a continuous strengthening of its defense might as well. Enormous achievements in industry and agriculture make it possible to furnish the Armed Forces with everything they need for military life and activities and to maintain the combat efficiency of units and combined units at the level dictated by today's requirements. The army and navy receive sophisticated weapons and equipment. Actions by the Soviet Union in the area of defense are aimed at protecting this country and its socialist friends against potential aggression from any quarter, at preserving peace and strengthening international security.

The documents in this volume show that in recent years the party has done a great deal of work in the area of Communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens and their mobilization to carry out the tasks of building communism. Of particular importance is the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" (pp 353-368). It thoroughly analyzes problems connected with various aspects of ideological work at the contemporary stage and formulates in concrete terms the party's comprehensive approach to statement of the entire business of indoctrination, that is, securement of a close unity of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination. The decree formulates an extensive long-range program of indoctrination of Soviet citizens in a spirit of high ideals, dedication to the homeland, the ideas of communism, and implacable opposition to bourgeois ideology. It draws attention to a vitally important Leninist principle -- unity of word and deed, and orders a significant improvement in the activities of the mass information media, oral and agitation propaganda.

The CPSU Central Committee instructed the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy to carry out measures aimed at further strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as to build upon the fine traditions of the army and navy, service in which is an outstanding school of labor and military proficiency, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship. Soviet servicemen should be deeply aware of their duty pertaining to securing the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the cause of peace and socialism.

This decree, as well as the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers, held in October 1979, were important events in the ideological-political affairs of the party and the entire Soviet people.

The documents in this volume provide a vivid picture of the successes of Soviet citizens in developing and deepening cooperation with brother peoples and socialist economic integration of the CEMA member nations on a plan basis and in strengthening the might of the nations of the socialist community. A number of CPSU Central Committee decrees emphatically reconfirmed the party's dedication to the principles of proletarian internationalism and a policy of all-out strengthening of the fraternal alliance and friendship of the socialist nations. The CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On the 110th Anniversary of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's Birth," dated 13 December 1979 (pp 531-542), notes that the prosperity of each of the countries of the socialist community is inseparably linked with strengthening of their ideological-political unity and growing community in politics, economics, social affairs, and development of fruitful cooperation in all areas on a basis of equality. An example of such cooperation is the interaction of the brother countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact organization and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance, grounded on the Leninist principles of international solidarity.

Conversations held between Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and the leaders of brother parties and governments held in the Crimea in July-August 1978 played an important role in uniting the socialist community and in deepening comprehensive cooperation among the brother parties, governments and peoples. In the document "In the CPSU Central Committee" (pp 237-240) the CPSU Central Committee Politburo stressed that the importance of further development of cooperation among the socialist countries on the solid foundation of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, and coordination of their actions in the interests of fostering advance of the cause of peace and social progress was reconfirmed in the course of the Crimean meetings. The decree notes that even in an international situation which has become more complex, the Soviet Union intends, together with its friends and allies to work persistently to deepen the process of détente, to achieve expanded peaceful, mutually advantageous cooperation among nations, to bring an end to the arms race and to accomplish a shift to disarmament.

As is noted in the documents contained in this volume, of great importance for strengthening the position of the world socialist community were visits by a Soviet party-government delegation, headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 30 May-2 June 1978 (pp 128-129), to the Hungarian People's Republic on 30 May-1 June 1979 (pp 383-383), and to the German Democratic Republic on 4-8 October 1979 (pp 489-491). In the course of talks there took place an exchange of views on all major aspects of cooperation between the brother countries, with determination of the principal directions to be taken in improving and deepening cooperation over the long term. A clear-cut resolve by the socialist nations to stint no effort for the sake of strengthening peace was expressed with renewed emphasis. A worthy rebuke was given to those who would attempt, under various fabricated pretexts, to initiate a new and dangerous round of escalation of the arms race and to thwart international détente. It is emphasized in this volume that the Soviet Union, working in close cooperation with the other nations of the socialist commonwealth, will persistently endeavor to achieve progress on all questions of disarmament under negotiation and a radical improvement in the entire international atmosphere.

It is noted in the volume that an enormous role in ensuring international stability, strengthening peace and security is played by periodic meetings of top officials of

the socialist nations. Conferences of central committee secretaries of the Communist and worker parties of the socialist countries were held on 23-25 October 1978 in Budapest and on 3-5 June 1980 in Berlin, conferences which dealt with organizational-party work (pp 247-249, 639-641). A conference of central committee secretaries of Communist and worker parties of the socialist countries was held in Berlin on 3-5 July 1979, dealing with international and ideological matters (pp 452-456).

Representatives of the socialist nations, in the process of bilateral and multilateral contacts, note the community of goals and unity of views on the development of international relations. They stress the unswerving aspiration of the USSR and the socialist countries to work persistently to ensure that détente continues to be a leading trend in international relations and that political détente is joined by military détente.

The positive changes which are taking place in the world are meeting fierce resistance on the part of imperialist reaction. It is pointed out in this volume that "in the NATO countries, alongside acknowledgement of the positive character of the Soviet initiative, they continue trying to come up with far-fetched arguments in order to carry out the dangerous plans of deploying new U.S. medium range nuclear missile weapons in Western Europe, that is, to disrupt the balance of military forces of the two groupings which has become established on this continent" (page 490). Militarist and reactionary circles are stepping up their attacks on détente, are endeavoring to alter the balance of power in their favor, are escalating the arms race, and are attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of other peoples and to crush liberation movements.

China's leaders, who are pursuing a hegemonistic great-power policy which is hostile to the cause of peace and socialism, are direct accomplices of imperialism. Exposing the substance of this policy and demonstrating the incompatibility between the ideology and practice of Maoism on the one hand and scientific socialism on the other, the CPSU at the same time stands firm for normalization of intergovernmental relations and for genuine good-neighbor relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USSR and the PRC.

The documents contained in this volume show that, in implementing the Peace Program elaborated at the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses, the Soviet Union is working consistently and persistently to achieve development of international cooperation and is unswervingly implementing a Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence between the two opposing social systems.

The CPSU and Soviet Government have done and are doing everything possible to assist and support peoples which are struggling against imperialism, neocolonialism, and racism, for strengthening peace and international security, for bringing an end to the arms race, and for disarmament.

The entire content of Volume 13 confirms the fact that the CPSU, displaying constant concern for increasing the prosperity of the Soviet people, works consistently to implement the Peace Program. Matters connected with the campaign to deepen international détente occupy our party's attention focus. An impassioned appeal to defend peace, to prevent nuclear war, and to hold the highly dangerous arms race in check

once again rang out from the rostrum of the 26th CPSU Congress. This appeal was backed up by concrete proposals aimed at achieving a radical improvement in the international situation. These initiatives served as an organic continuation and development of our party's Peace Program as applied to the most critical, urgent problems of the present day. The 26th CPSU Congress reconfirmed the will of the party and the entire people to put an end to wars, to establish permanent world peace, and to achieve the ultimate objective of building communism.

The documents and materials of the 26th CPSU Congress specify new tasks pertaining to strengthening the economic and defense might of our homeland; they constitute a logical continuation of the domestic and foreign policy elaborated by the 25th CPSU Congress.

This collected volume will unquestionably help commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations gain a better mastery of points of Marxist-Leninist theory and help them develop even more extensively work on ideological-political indoctrination of personnel.

The materials in Volume 13 are organized in chronological order and have been checked against the primary sources. Some documents are published for the first time, while many of them, which previously had appeared in summary or extract form, are presented in their entirety.

FOOTNOTES

1. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i Plenumov TsK (1978-1980)," K. U. Chernenko and A. G. Yegorova, editors, Vol 13, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 654 pages.

2. Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 66.

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WAR MEMOIRS CRITICIZED FOR INACCURACIES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 81 (signed to press 23 Jul 81) pp 79-82

[Article by Col I. Noskov and Col (Ret) M. Gorb: "Departures From Fact Depreciate a Deed"]

[Text] In recent years a great many books, pamphlets and articles dealing with the Great Patriotic War have been published in this country, and this is understandable. The further the events of the war recede into the past, the greater the interest displayed in them by Soviet citizens, especially young people. One can state without exaggeration that such memoirs as L. I. Brezhnev's trilogy "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth] and "Tselina" [Virgin Soil], which was awarded the Lenin Prize, G. K. Zhukov's "Vosponinaniya i razmyshleniya" [Reminiscences and Reflections], A. M. Vasilevskiy's "Delo vsey zhizni" [Lifelong Cause], and K. K. Rokossovskiy's "Soldatskiy dolg" [Soldier's Duty] have become genuine desktop companions. They teach how one should love and defend the homeland and hate its enemies. Many books on the war win over the reader with their depth of content and accuracy of description of events. One still encounters memoirs and articles, however, which contain inaccuracies, errors, and even distortions of historical reality. A typical shortcoming of such publications is exaggeration of the feats of individuals, subunits, and sometimes even larger military units. Lt Gen G. S. Nadysev, for example, describing the offensive by the troops of the 70th and 47th armies north of Warsaw in October 1944, states: "...General Kazakov (artillery commander of the First Belorussian Front -- auth.) ordered the artillery commanders of the armies to move up all close support guns into and beyond the forward line of the attacking extended lines of riflemen, to ensure that the infantry were provided covering fire and protected by the gun shields. For this reason, or as a consequence of other measures, the offensive began to develop successfully. Missions in the Modlin sector were successfully accomplished."[1] This is not true, however. The infantry close support guns never advanced ahead of the extended lines of riflemen in the attack. In addition, could large numbers of rifle troops be protected behind their shields? Of course not. A gun shield does not protect against frontal shell fragments and bullets even the gun crew, except for the gunner and, to some extent, the loader. The former commander of the 239th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 76th Division, who participated in the above operation on the main axis of advance of the 70th Army, and one of the authors of this article, is unable to corroborate such a fact, just as archival sources fail to corroborate it.

G. S. Nadysev also erred in his assessment of the offensive. It was not successful in the Modlin sector. G. K. Zhukov, arriving at that time from the First Belorussian Front, reported to the Supreme Commander: "I believe that this offensive will give us nothing but casualties. And from an operational standpoint we are not in any particular need of the area northwest of Warsaw."[2] We know that I. V. Stalin agreed with these conclusions. The offensive of the 70th and 47th armies was halted.

Engr-Maj Gen (Ret) N. Komarov, author of an article entitled "Legendary Gun," which appeared in the 7 June 1977 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, also greatly exaggerated the historical facts. Relating the story of 76 mm divisional gun No 256563, he notes: "On its journey from Stalingrad to Ternopol' it destroyed 10 German tanks, 5 armored personnel carriers, 5 self-propelled guns, 15 trucks, 16 artillery pieces, 4 antitank guns, 7 mortars, 26 earth-and-timber emplacements, and killed 5 battalions of Hitlerites. It fired more than 11,000 rounds...." That was impossible. In the first place, it is impossible to calculate enemy losses and casualties from one gun, since dozens of guns are delivering fire on the same target. Secondly, it is necessary to expend approximately 300-400 76 mm shells to put out of action a single person sheltered in a simple foxhole. During the war in Vietnam, for example, the Americans expended an average of 340 105 and 155 mm caliber projectiles to accomplish this result.[3] One can easily calculate how many rounds gun No 256563 fired. Its capabilities are obviously exaggerated by a factor of 70-80.

A sketch by Ye. Bogatyrev entitled "Comrade Mito" appears in NEDELYA (No 51, 1975). The author relates the combat feats of Dmitriy Militonovich Ioseliani, party organizer of a partisan detachment. "Mito" -- this was his nickname in the detachment -- wearing the uniform of a German officer, made his way into the enemy's lair on numerous occasions, obtained important intelligence, and on several occasions stole automobiles out from under the noses of the Hitlerites. All this he accomplished in a highly skillful manner and was quite elusive. His name, the author states, "struck fear into the hearts of the Germans.... The enemy placed thousands of marks on his head.... Comrade Mito is credited with killing 460 fascist officers and enlisted men." The author does not make a single reference to official publications or archival sources.

For purposes of comparison, we might recall that famed snipers Heroes of the Soviet Union Vasiliy Zaytsev and Nikolay Il'in, who went hunting for the enemy on a daily basis, killed approximately 300 and 329 enemy officers and men respectively during the course of the war. And yet D. Ioseliani was engaged in intelligence missions, where combat was not the rule but the exception. Or take another example. Commendations awarding the title Hero of the Soviet Union state: "...Jr Sgt P. M. Baranov was the first to fight his way into the enemy trench, killing four German soldiers and securing the crossing of an assault detachment";[4] "MSgt I. V. Kirik killed three Germans in hand-to-hand fighting..., sacrificing his own life to save his commander."[5] From these and many other official Hero of the Soviet Union commendation documents it is evident that in hand-to-hand combat with fire and bayonet, soldiers are capable of killing a few, not dozens of enemy officers and enlisted men.

In a book entitled "Only the Strong Emerged From the Fire Alive,"[6] Col F. M. Yerovoy tells of the outstanding deeds of battalion party organizer Sr Lt Khaim Shteyngart: "...he took the place of the killed company commander and did an excellent job....

Shteyngart was wounded in the leg, but he ignored it, continued fighting, and took four Germans prisoner" (page 8). The author further relates how Shteyngart went out with scouts on a night patrol to take an enemy prisoner for interrogation (page 39) and how during one engagement he "took an entrenching tool from its case and proceeded to ward off flying grenades. He proved very skillful at this" (page 47). And the reader is expected to accept all this on faith, without any documentary corroboration.

Published accounts about reconnaissance scouts contained particularly large numbers of exaggerations. A book entitled "Forever in the People's Heart"[7] states: "In the course of the War N. Ya. Khodosov's platoon captured 387 enemy personnel for interrogation, including 28 officers and 2 general officers." These figures are not backed up by documentary evidence and place in doubt the authenticity of the entire material. Apparently the authors do not have a clear idea on what it means to capture a prisoner for interrogation while in a defensive posture, when both sides are dug in and protected behind barbed wire and minefields. In addition, the mission of capturing an enemy soldier for interrogation is accomplished not by one individual but by a group. Here are some statements made by veteran soldiers.

Mar SU P. K. Koshevoy: "The failures of recon patrols were disappointing.... Subunit commanders were doing their utmost to capture an enemy soldier for interrogation, but for an extended period of time were unsuccessful in their attempts."[9]

Maj Gen M. A. Voloshin (39th Army intelligence chief): "The capture of an enemy soldier for interrogation, especially during a period when combat operations are of a static nature, is a highly difficult and dangerous undertaking. Recon scouts frequently paid for success with their blood. And unfortunately it would sometimes happen that the blood and deaths of our comrades would fail to produce the desired result."[10] Reconnaissance scout I. Dmitrishin: "'Snatching' an enemy soldier for interrogation is the most difficult, most complex and dangerous recon skill.... It is a thousand times easier to kill him (the enemy -- Auth.) than to capture him."[11]

Capturing a prisoner for interrogation is an extremely difficult undertaking. They were taken in small numbers during the war, not by the dozen and by the hundred, as some authors sometimes state. Here is what documents have to say about it.

In the course of June 1944 a total of 25 reconnaissance engagements were conducted by small parties for the purpose of capturing prisoners in the zone of the 60th Army of the First Ukrainian Front, south of the city of Brody. These efforts resulted in the capture of only 30 enemy officers and men, who provided valuable information on the German troop dispositions and defenses in the zone of the forthcoming offensive by the large strategic formation.[12]

Or take another fact. As a result of night patrols by units of the 18th Rifle Corps (from December 1944 through the first 10 days of January 1945), a total of 10 enemy soldiers were captured, from the enemy's 34th, 109th and 111th Infantry regiments and the reconnaissance battalion of the 35th Division.[13] It is evident from these examples that over a period of from one to one and a half months a rifle regiment was able to capture on the average one enemy soldier for purposes of interrogation. And this was considered a good batting average.

If the authors of these memoirs and articles were acquainted with archival documents (situation reports and intelligence summaries of units, combined units and formations, report materials of intelligence units and the materials of teams synthesizing the experience of the war), it is unlikely that such glaring discrepancies would occur, contrary to the facts, logic, and realities.

Exaggeration of the deeds of individuals and subunits engenders a false idea about the war. Reading Ye. Bogatyrev's sketch entitled "Comrade Mito," for example, the young reader might imagine that it was easy to defeat the enemy, that only desire was necessary. In actual fact, however, victory was won by the Soviet people in difficult combat and at a heavy price.

Authors make a great many errors due to poor knowledge of military affairs and military history. In addition, some of them fail to make a preliminary study of the appropriate literature, reference materials, and archival documents, without which the truth cannot be established. A sketch by V. Desyatirik entitled "With Lenin in One's Heart" appeared, for example, in OGONEK, No 16, 1978. It contained the following lines: "Another sacred relic was discovered in Stalingrad in August 1942 in a soldier's canteen. 'Dear ones!' we read in this soldier's message. 'A farewell greeting from Sergey. Mother, I carried out the oath I swore to you. I have put nine 'tigers' to rest on Soviet soil. I have avenged Fruza and the children, who perished in Brest, and I have avenged our desecrated homeland. The ammunition is running out, but the vermin keep coming (that is, tanks -- Auth.). We have received no reinforcements. I have not had a single drop of water for three days, although the Volga is nearby. I am dying for the great party of Lenin."

One reads this with consternation, for the Hitlerites had no Tiger tanks in August 1942, nor were there any battles taking place in Stalingrad at the time. They began on 13 September. All this attests to the fact that the author is not familiar with military history.

During the war Col F. Yerovoy commanded a rifle battalion. He should know subunit tactics. And yet he makes unforgettable errors in his book "Only the Strong Emerged From the Fire Alive"." Here is how he describes the actions of Capt I. I. Morozov's combat engineer company in the summer of 1943 in the fighting in the Orel area. Working at night, under heavy hostile rifle and machinegun fire, it was clearing mines from an area along the Chern' River. The combat engineers continued working in the no-man's-land as morning came, and as the day progressed. During daylight the enemy intensified the small-arms fire. What course of action should they take? The combat engineers found a solution: "Somebody suggested that we get over into the stream. everybody liked the idea. We crawled toward the bank one man at a time, hugging the ground. Some of the men remained in place and covered us. We were sitting in the murky water with only our heads sticking out. It was exquisitely cool and quiet! But within 30 minutes we were chilled to the bone. Our shoulders and arms became numb" (page 62), etc.

Well written, but contrary to fact. According to engineer troop tactics, just before dawn combat engineers would always leave the neutral zone and withdraw behind friendly forward positions. Otherwise they would be killed.

There are many similar discrepancies with the demands of field manuals and regulations in F. M. Yerovoy's memoirs. There is expressed throughout the entire book the

idea that the battalion commander (that is, the author of the book) did not direct the battalion's combat but always fought in the forward line, killing fascists with bayonet and hand grenade. It is true that in the course of this self-praise he sometimes "censures" himself for getting away from his battalion command duties. Relating the capture of a Tiger tank in the neutral zone, Yerovoy writes: "I cursed myself vehemently. I had forgotten that a battalion commander has quite different duties. And now the two of us were about to be killed like idiots" (page 25).

One wonders who is taught what by such memoirs? Why publicize that which is contrary to the elementary duties of position, against military regulations and common sense?

K. Garashchenko also deserves criticism.[14] After reading his book one has the impression that the author does not understand military affairs. For example, he claims that the German Tiger tank had an 80 mm gun (page 56), while it actually carried an 88 mm gun, that a gun commander received radio messages (page 28), although a radio set was not gun crew organic equipment, etc.

In conclusion we should like to state that these deficiencies could have been avoided if the authors of these books, sketches and articles were a bit more demanding on themselves. Before writing, one must thoroughly study one's subject on the basis of published literature and documentary sources, archival and reference materials, periodicals and field manuals of those times. A heroic feat does not need embellishment or exaggeration. Fabrications and inventions depreciate it and do harm to the ideological and political indoctrination of military personnel and young people of induction and preinduction age.

FOOTNOTES

1. G. S. Nadysev, "Na sluzhbe shtabnoy" [In Staff Service], second, enlarged edition, Voyenizdat, 1976, page 192.

2. G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1970, page 559.

3. PRAVDA, 20 September 1978.

4. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 33, List 793756, File 4, Sheet 178.

5. Ibid., File 21, Sheet 88.

6. Yerovoy, P. M., "Tol'ko krepche vykhodili iz ognya," Voyenizdat, 1972.

7. "Navechno v serdtse narodnom" [Forever in the People's Heart], second, enlarged and amended edition, Minsk, Izd. Glavnoy redaktsii Belorusskoy Sovetskoy Entsiklopedii, 1970, page 476.

8. [Footnote omitted.]

9. Koshevoy, P. K., "V gody voyennyye" [In the War Years], Voyenizdat, 1978, page 231.

10. Voloshin, M. A., "Razvedchiki vsegda vperedi" [Recon Scouts Are Always Out Ahead], Voyenizdat, 1977, page 18.

11. I. P. Dmitrishin, "Po zovu pamyati" [At Memory's Call], Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1973, pp 27-29.

12. "Nastupleniye strelkovogo korpusa. Po opytu Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Rifle Corps Offensive. According to the Experience ofthe Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1958, page 164.

13. Ibid.

14. K. Garashchenko, "Ne zarastayut soldatskiye tropy" [Soldier Trails Do Not Become Overgrown], Moscow, Izd-vo DOSAAF, 1970.

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